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DISRUPTIVE PHILANTHROPY: CHAN-ZUCKERBERG, THE 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND THE MILLIONAIRE 
NEXT DOOR
Dana Brakman Reiser*
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Dr. Priscilla Chan, 
have pledged to give 99% of their net worth to—in their words—
“advance[e] human potential and promot[e] equal opportunity.” To make 
good on this promise, however, they did not set up a traditional nonprofit, 
tax-exempt organization. Instead, they founded the Chan-Zuckerberg 
Initiative, a limited liability company (LLC). The bulk of this Article 
provides the definitive explanation for this seemingly bizarre choice. 
Importantly, the philanthropy LLC structure offers donors the flexibility 
to bolster charitable grantmaking with impact investment and political
advocacy, free of the restrictions, penalties, and transparency 
requirements applied to tax-exempt vehicles. The LLC form also 
provides donors complete control over the organizations they found, 
including an ability to reclaim donated assets that is absolutely prohibited 
in traditional forms. With careful planning, all of these advantages can be 
gained at relatively little tax cost—especially in a post-2017 tax 
environment. The philanthropy LLC is poised to spread beyond Silicon 
Valley to the millionaire next door, a development with the potential to 
do both good and harm. In its concluding section, the Article explores 
how a turn to such disruptive philanthropic vehicles can both unleash 
tremendous capital for solving society’s most challenging problems and
magnify the influence of its most powerful elites.
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INTRODUCTION
On the occasion of the birth of their first child, Facebook founder and 
billionaire Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, pediatrician Dr. Priscilla Chan, 
announced they would give 99% of their net worth to “advance human 
potential and promote equality for all children in the next generation.”1
They published a long letter to their new daughter, Max, committing to 
this massive gift and identifying their “initial areas of focus [as] 
personalized learning, curing disease, connecting people and building 
strong communities.”2 The letter connected their efforts to their career 
experiences as a social media entrepreneur and doctor/educator, and 
underscored their sense of responsibility to use their success to improve 
the lives of Max’s generation.3 But they did not create a charity to helm 
their philanthropic efforts—they formed a limited liability company.
The moment was tender and the letter was heartfelt, yet reactions were 
mixed. Many lauded the generosity of Chan and Zuckerberg, linking their 
generosity to that of generations of America’s magnates-turned-
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philanthropists from Carnegie and Rockefeller to Gates and Buffet’s 
Giving Pledge.4 Others were skeptical.5
Chan and Zuckerberg were relative novices in the philanthropy world. 
Chan had experience working with education and healthcare charities 
running back to her college days at least.6 Her latest efforts created The 
Primary School, a nonprofit providing free preschool and primary 
education integrated with health care services for students in underserved 
Bay Area communities.7 This ambitious project, however, was launched 
just two months before the couple’s big announcement.8 Zuckerberg had 
made his first foray into philanthropy with a huge and much ballyhooed 
donation to the Newark public schools in 2010.9 That effort did nothing 
to establish his reputation for wisdom and efficacy as a philanthropist—
                                                                                                                     
4. See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Zuckerberg, Gates, Buffett and the Triumph of Competitive 
Philanthropy, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/12/02/mark-zuckerberg-bill-gates-warren-buffett-and-triumph-of-competitive-
philanthropy/?utm_term=.7b510479418e (discussing how Gates and Buffett have created a 
philanthropic competition); Bill George, America is in the Midst of a Philanthropic Revolution,
FORTUNE (Jan. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/01/17/philanthropy-america-zuckerberg-gates/
(noting that American philanthropists are following a long line of benefactors); Bloomberg News, 
Zuckerberg Philanthropy Pledge Sets New Giving Standard, PRIVATE WEALTH (Dec. 2, 2015), 
https://www.fa-mag.com/news/zuckerberg-philanthropy-pledge-sets-new-giving-standard-
24088.html (discussing how Zuckerberg’s pledge is in the same league with other billionaires).
5. See, e.g., Leslie Lenkowsky, Ending Philanthropy as We Know It, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 
2015, at A15 (noting the risks of the LLC structure, and for-profit efforts to solve social problems 
more generally, and opining that if CZI “succeeds, it may bring an end to philanthropy as we have 
known it”); Jesse Eisinger, How Mark Zuckerberg’s Altruism Helps Himself, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 
3, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-mark-zuckerbergs-altruism-helps-himself
(“Mark Zuckerberg did not donate $45 billion to charity. You may have heard that, but that was 
wrong.”); David Olive, Zuckerberg’s $46B Charitable Gift Not What it Seems, TORONTO STAR
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/business/2015/12/11/zuckerbergs-46b-charitable-gift-
not-what-it-seems.html (“Writ large, these mega-donations by the super-wealthy amount to a 
creeping privatization of social-service provision. Or, put another way, they are the removal of 
democratic principles from the provision of essential societal needs. This ‘black-box charity’ is 
no solution.”).
6. See Queenie Wong, Priscilla Chan, In Rare Interview, Tells How Her Goals with Mark 
Zuckerberg Are Shaped by Personal Story, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/04/01/priscilla-chan-in-rare-interview-tells-how-her-goals-
with-mark-zuckerberg-are-shaped-by-personal-story/.
7. See Overview, PRIMARY SCH., https://www.theprimaryschool.org/overview/.
8. See Wong, supra note 6.
9. The announcement of his donation was made on The Oprah Winfrey Show, to much 
fanfare. See Mark Zuckerberg Announces $100 Million Grant, OPRAH.COM (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.oprah.com/own-oprahshow/mark-zuckerbergs-big-announcement-video (providing a 
video clip of the broadcast); see also Richard Perez-Pena, Facebook Founder to Donate $100 
Million to Help Remake Newark’s Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/education/23newark.html (detailing the gift). 
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it was widely regarded as a spectacular failure.10 None of their efforts, of 
course, was on anything like the scale of the massive project the couple 
dubbed the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative (CZI).
CZI raises questions not only about competence, but also about power. 
This is not new. Big philanthropy has long raised concerns about the 
power it affords already potent elites. Andrew Carnegie’s announcement 
that he planned to give away his fortune over a century ago was met with 
concerns about the provenance of his wealth—made on the backs of 
workers—and his apparent belief that he was better able to determine 
how to improve their lives than they would be.11 When the ranks of 
industrialist do-gooders swelled in the early twentieth century, alarm over 
greed and paternalism was joined by charges that the foundations they 
established were antidemocratic.12 Mid-century, these concerns 
culminated in tax reforms intended to prevent the wealthy from abusing 
philanthropic tax benefits and further concentrating their economic and 
political power through their charitable entities.13 Critiques of elite 
philanthropy resurfaced around the expansion of the Gates Foundation, 
initiation of the Giving Pledge, and again with CZI. The arguments that 
charitable endeavors allow the wealthiest to sanitize their tremendous 
advantage and further increase their influence over society are persistent.
By organizing as a limited liability company, the Chan Zuckerberg 
Initiative avoids one particularly trenchant strain of this criticism. 
Donating funds to CZI does not create an immediate tax write-off for its 
founders.14 Chan and Zuckerberg must pay federal and state tax on 
income they receive from CZI. They must pay state and local property 
taxes on any real estate it owns and sales taxes on any purchases it makes. 
If they die owning interests in it, these interests will be part of their 
taxable estates. CZI is simply not a tax-exempt institution, and cannot 
access the array of subsidies such entities receive. 
                                                                                                                     
10. An exhaustive account of the donation and its aftermath can be found in DALE 
RUSSAKOFF, THE PRIZE: WHO’S IN CHARGE OF AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (2015).
11. See David Nasaw, Looking the Carnegie Gift Horse in the Mouth: The 19th-Century 
Critique of Big Philanthropy, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/history_lesson/2006/11/looking_the_carnegie_gift_horse_in_the_mouth.html.
12. See Rob Reich, On the Role of Foundations in Democracies, in PHILANTHROPY IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 64–65 (Rob Reich et al. eds., 2016) (describing the “fierce criticism” John 
D. Rockefeller received for his efforts in the early 1900s to create a philanthropic foundation 
perceived as antidemocratic). 
13. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL 
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 76–80 (2004); John G. Simon, The Regulation of American 
Foundations: Looking Backward at the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 6 VOLUNTAS 243, 243–46 (1995).
14. See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/ 
posts/10102507695055801?pnref=story.
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Still, to some, structuring CZI as an LLC raised alarm bells. Skeptics 
were anxious that there must be some nefarious reason for this nongift 
gift, prompting Zuckerberg to mount a defense of his unusual 
philanthropic vehicle.15 But CZI is not the first philanthropic institution 
to adopt a for-profit form,16 and there are numerous benign explanations 
for this organizational design. 
For-profit vehicles for philanthropy, and particularly the philanthropy 
LLC model, provide founders substantial operational flexibility. Unlike 
nonprofit, tax-exempt entities, an LLC is free to combine traditional 
grantmaking with strategic investments and political advocacy. This 
freedom of approach, especially when combined with the far greater 
privacy and control an LLC provides, can understandably be worth 
trading for foregone tax benefits. The unusual nature of this philanthropic 
structure also fits the disruptive mantra that has driven so much of Silicon 
Valley’s success.
The remainder of this Article will explore the future of this innovative 
structure and its consequences. Part I will describe philanthropy LLCs in 
action, first by chronicling the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative’s first years, 
and then by connecting it with its predecessors and the broader Silicon 
Valley context in which it arose. The next two Parts consider the tradeoffs 
inherent in this particular kind of disruptive philanthropy. Part II traces 
the advantages philanthropy LLCs offer in operational flexibility, 
privacy, and control for founders, as compared with traditional nonprofit 
philanthropic vehicles. Part III evaluates the tax benefits a philanthropy 
LLC sacrifices, which are not as substantial as might be expected, and 
how changes affected by the 2017 tax legislation may further reduce 
those benefits. Part IV then asks whether the philanthropy LLC will 
remain an exclusive plaything of the ultra-rich, or will be attractive to 
other (merely) high-net-worth individuals. It also contemplates the 
impact widespread adoption of such structures would have on American 
philanthropy and society. Part V briefly concludes.
                                                                                                                     
15. See Zuckerberg, supra note 14 (“By using an LLC instead of a traditional foundation, 
we receive no tax benefit from transferring our shares to the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, but we 
gain flexibility to execute our mission more effectively. In fact, if we transferred our shares to a 
traditional foundation, then we would have received an immediate tax benefit, but by using an 
LLC we do not. And just like everyone else, we will pay capital gains taxes when our shares are 
sold by the LLC.”).
16. Although LLC laws typically permit formation for “any lawful purpose,” see Robert 
Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations—For-Profits, Nonprofits, and Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 553, 570–72 (2009) (describing these and other limitations), the form and its 
widespread use is associated with the for-profit sector. 
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I. CZI AND THE PHILANTHROPY LLC MODEL
The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative is a very new organization, but it has 
already made some big bets. Its most significant charitable commitment 
came about a year after its inception, when CZI announced it would spend 
$3 billion on medical research over the next ten years.17 Twenty percent 
of this sum funded Biohub, a nonprofit research institution dedicated “to 
develop new technologies that will enable doctors to cure, prevent or 
manage all diseases during our children’s lifetime.”18 Biohub partnered 
with Berkeley, Stanford, and the University of California San Francisco 
and inaugurated initiatives to map every type of human cell and to 
develop better diagnostic and treatment options for infectious diseases.19
CZI jumped into impact investing too—making investments designed 
to achieve a combination of financial and social returns. It made a $24 
million investment in Andela, a company that trains engineers in Africa 
for placement at top global technology firms, leading its Series B round.20
It also acquired Meta—a Canadian startup that developed artificial 
intelligence technology to analyze and assimilate medical research data, 
making it more usable by scientists.21 CZI plans to offer the research 
community free and open access to Meta’s tools,22 and has announced a 
$5.5 million grant to University of Massachusetts researchers to help 
develop them.23
The Initiative is also developing its advocacy program. It tapped 
David Plouffe, a former senior advisor to President Barack Obama, to 
lead its policy and advocacy efforts in early 2017.24 Demonstrating 
political savvy right out of the gate, Plouffe’s hiring was announced 
alongside the appointment of Kenneth Mehlman, who managed President 
                                                                                                                     
17. See Katie Benner, Not Thinking Small for $3 Billion Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2016, at B6.
18. CHAN ZUCKERBERG BIOHUB, https://czbiohub.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
19. See id.
20. See Nathan McAlone, Mark Zuckerberg Just Made a Big Investment in a Startup That 
Pays Young People in Africa to Learn Code, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chan-zuckerberg-initiative-leads-24-million-round-in-andela-
2016-6.
21. See Liat Clark, Why the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative is Buying AI Search Tool Meta,
WIRED (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/chan-zuckerberg-initiative-buys-ai-
scientific-search-tool-meta.
22. See id.
23. See Katheleen Conti, UMass Gets Grant Funds from Chan Zuckerberg; Charity Will 
Back AI Research Tool Project, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.boston.com/
news/education/2018/01/21/umass-is-getting-a-5-5-million-grant-from-the-chan-zuckerberg-
initiative.
24. See Mike Isaac, Chan Zuckerberg Initiative Builds Political Muscle for Philanthropic 
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/technology/chan-
zuckerberg-initiative-builds-political-muscle-for-philanthropic-work.html.
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George W. Bush’s 2004 re-election, to lead CZI’s policy advisory 
board.25
These early efforts take advantage of the flexible structure CZI’s 
founders adopted. As an LLC, it can make both grants to nonprofit 
entities like a traditional foundation and equity investments and 
acquisitions like a venture capital or private equity fund.26 Its policy 
efforts have not been as transparent—discretion being another boon of 
organization as an LLC—but they are unimpeded by the stringent 
regulatory limits that would apply to a tax-exempt nonprofit. 
A. Disruptive Philanthropy Pioneers
As deftly as CZI has employed disruptive philanthropy, it cannot 
claim to have invented it. Other Silicon Valley philanthropists pioneered 
the philanthropy LLC and for-profit philanthropy vehicles more 
generally. They too have used these creative structures to achieve 
operational flexibility, privacy, and control. 
One of the earliest examples of the LLC structure is the Emerson 
Collective, founded by Laurene Powell Jobs in 2004.27 Powell Jobs, the 
widow of Apple founder Steve Jobs, has a reported net worth of nearly 
$20 billion.28 She uses Emerson as a coordinated hub for her 
grantmaking, investment activity (particularly investment in social 
enterprises), and political action.29 Emerson funds a number of nonprofits 
in the education space, including College Track, a nonprofit education 
and mentoring organization Powell Jobs founded prior to Emerson’s 
creation,30 and XQ: The Super School Project, a $50 million project 
                                                                                                                     
25. See id.
26. See About, CHAN ZUCKERBERG INITIATIVE, https://chanzuckerberg.com/about/ (last 
visited June 6, 2018) (“We look for bold ideas — regardless of structure and stage — and help 
them scale . . . . We make long-term investments because important breakthroughs often take 
decades, or even centuries.”). Previously, the CZI website was even more explicit about this issue. 
The prior version of the “About” page explained, “We invest in the best ideas regardless of 
organizational structure. That includes nonprofit and for profit entities, as well as non-
governmental research institutions.” See Kate Bramson and Linda Borg, Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckerberg visits Providence school, meets with governor, PROVIDENCE J. (May 22, 2017, 9:08 
PM); Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg visits Del Sesto Middle School, ABC6 NEWS (Jun. 5, 
2017, 5:39 PM) (quoting this language).
27. See Company Overview of The Emerson Collective LLC, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=263956917.
28. See Laurene Powell Jobs & Family: Real Time Net Worth, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/profile/laurene-powell-jobs/.
29. See Our Mission, EMERSON COLLECTIVE, http://www.emersoncollective.com/about-us.
30. See Our History, C. TRACK, https://collegetrack.org/who-we-are/our-history/ (last 
visited June 9, 2018) (describing its founding, by Ms. Powell Jobs and Carlos Watson, in the 
1990s).
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initiated in 2015 to rethink public high schools.31 Emerson’s investments 
have been eclectic, in recent years ranging from providing seed funding 
to education and health technology startups; to leading a Series A round 
for Neighborly, an online broker for municipal bonds;32 to buying a 
majority stake in The Atlantic.33 Emerson also cites immigration reform 
among its priorities,34 and can use advocacy and political contributions 
to pursue it. The Emerson Collective’s long tenure and deep pockets 
suggest these publicized efforts may only scratch the surface of its 
activities. Ms. Powell Jobs is famously private,35 preferring anonymous 
gifts and the retreat from the spotlight that Emerson’s LLC structure 
facilitates.
In 1995, eBay founder Pierre Omidyar and his wife, Pam, began their 
organized philanthropic efforts by creating a traditional nonprofit 
foundation. In 2004, however, they established an LLC to broaden the 
types of strategies they could use to achieve their philanthropic goals.36
Operating together and now known as The Omidyar Network, the 
nonprofit private foundation continues to make grants primarily to 
operating charities while the LLC arm makes impact investments 
intended to drive social change.37 Both types of efforts stretch across a 
range of issue areas, from education to financial inclusion.38 The Omidyar 
Network has also become an advocate for the value of impact investing. 
It warns that “[l]eaving the markets out of our efforts to tackle society’s 
most intractable problems ignores a powerful force for identifying viable 
                                                                                                                     
31. See Who We Are, XQ, https://xqsuperschool.org/whoweare (last visited June 9, 2018) 
(noting that Laurene Powell Jobs chairs the XQ board). 
32. Jase Wilson, Neighborly Raised a Series A, NEIGHBORLY (May 16, 2017), 
https://neighborly.com/learn/neighborly-raised-series.
33. See Gillian B. White, Emerson Collective Acquires Majority Stake in the Atlantic,
ATLANTIC (July 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/emerson-
collective-atlantic-coalition/535215/.
34. See Immigration, EMERSON COLLECTIVE, http://www.emersoncollective.com/ 
immigration/.
35. See Peter Lattman & Claire Cain Miller, A Modest Billionaire Makes Her Way Onto the 
Philanthropic Stage, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2013, at B1 (“Famous because of her last name and 
fortune, she has always been private and publicity-averse.”).
36. See Why a Hybrid Structure?, OMIDYAR NETWORK (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.omidyar.com/spotlight/why-hybrid-structure#content.
37. See id.
38. See Investees, OMIDYAR NETWORK, https://www.omidyar.com/investees; see also
Kevin Johnson, A Peek Inside Omidyar Network’s Methodology for Making Grants and 
Investments, NONPROFIT Q. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/11/30/peek-
inside-omidyar-networks-methodology-making-grants-investments/ (describing, for example, 
investments in insurance for the developing world).
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solutions that can scale to help millions.”39 Its tandem approach gives it 
access to the best of both worlds—nonprofit and for-profit 
philanthropy—and it tailors the capital it provides to the needs of 
particular issues, organizations, and geographies.40
While not the project of an individual philanthropist, the creation of 
Google.org in 2008 is another important antecedent. Google, Inc. had a 
traditional corporate foundation,41 but it changed course when it 
established an in-house division dedicated to philanthropy. Google.org 
has evolved and shifted its approach over time, and now describes its 
mission as “accelerat[ing] the progress of innovative nonprofits by 
connecting them to the best of Google.”42 Initially, though, Google.org 
had much in common with the philanthropy LLC structures of Emerson 
and Omidyar. It made investments in for-profits alongside charitable 
grants in its climate change, public health, and antipoverty areas of focus, 
and its efforts all leveraged its deep technology expertise.43 Launching 
these initiatives within a traditional nonprofit foundation would have 
risked violating a number of tax regulations.44 In contrast, the for-profit 
philanthropy strategy gave Google’s leaders operational flexibility, along 
with valuable privacy and ultimate control.45
Corporate experimentation with for-profit philanthropy has even 
spread beyond Silicon Valley. General Motors (GM) announced last year 
that as part of “overhauling its $30-million-a-year philanthropy efforts to 
focus on high-tech education, safety and economic sustainability,” it 
would shutter its longstanding General Motors Foundation.46 Going 
forward, GM’s philanthropy would be coordinated by its internal Global 
Corporate Giving department and grants would be made directly by the 
corporation.47 Like Google, GM made the move to enhance operational 
flexibility and improve the coordination of its business and philanthropic 
strategies.48
                                                                                                                     
39. Impact Investing, OMIDYAR NETWORK, https://www.omidyar.com/our-work/impact-
investing.
40. See id.
41. Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at vi (Aug. 18, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm (noting the 
establishment of the Google Foundation).
42. Our Work, GOOGLE.ORG, https://www.google.org/our-work/.
43. See Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2440–
42 (2009). 
44. See id. at 2452–62.
45. Id.
46. Melissa Burden, GM to End Foundation, Redirect its Charitable Giving, DETROIT NEWS
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B. A Silicon Valley Development
The GM development aside, for-profit philanthropy is very much 
associated with wealth generated by technology entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley. It is no accident that CZI and its predecessor philanthropy LLCs 
are all funded with tech wealth germinated there. Tech companies in 
Silicon Valley are certainly not the first to seize the mantle of corporate 
social responsibility. But they do make some of the boldest claims about 
the power of their businesses to solve social problems. Just last summer, 
Facebook announced a revision of its mission statement to “Give people 
the power to build community and bring the world closer together.”49
Using for-profit structures for philanthropy aligns with this ethic of 
blurring the boundary between generating profit and social good. Others 
might find the premise of for-profit philanthropy oxymoronic, if not 
unnerving. Entrepreneurs who view their behemoth for-profit businesses 
as catalysts for saving the world are instead drawn to it.
The idea of using a for-profit entity to pursue social good also fits 
seamlessly with the ethos of disruption that marks Silicon Valley culture. 
Fortunes are not built in the Valley by building a better mousetrap, but 
by reimagining an old industry or creating a new one from whole cloth. 
Disruption is not just a catchword for those who find ultimate success 
there. As David Callahan explains in his 2017 book on elite 
philanthropists, this “disruptor” group’s ability to see how to disrupt an 
industry is the key reason for their success and becomes an important part 
of its members’ self-concepts.50 Along the way, the top echelons of 
Silicon Valley billionaires develop a deep belief in the value of 
experimentation, of skepticism, and even of failure.
When they turn to philanthropic pursuits, they take these values with 
them. Using a typically for-profit structure to house a philanthropic 
institution is just the kind of off-the-wall idea that is prized in Silicon 
Valley: what they might call disruptive philanthropy. For a billionaire in 
a hoodie out to “move fast and break things,”51 shaking up the fusty 
private foundation “suits” is an attractive end in itself. If disruptive 
philanthropy will also give a founder flexibility, avoid regulatory 
complications, and enhance privacy—all without much foregone tax 
benefit—so much the better.
                                                                                                                     
49. About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/; see also Josh 
Constine, Facebook Changes Mission Statement to ‘Bring the World Closer Together,’ TECH
CRUNCH (June 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/22/bring-the-world-closer-together/
(describing the change).
50. See DAVID CALLAHAN, THE GIVERS: WEALTH, POWER, AND PHILANTHROPY IN A NEW 
GILDED AGE 112–35 (2017).
51. Nick Statt, Zuckerberg: ‘Move Fast and Break Things’ Isn’t how Facebook Operates 
Anymore, CNET (Apr. 30, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/zuckerberg-move-fast-
and-break-things-isnt-how-we-operate-anymore/.
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II. BENEFITS OF THE TRADEOFF 
Make no mistake: The LLC structure offers philanthropists very 
significant benefits. First among these is flexibility—an LLC can make 
grants to nonprofits, but it can also make investments in for-profits, 
participate deeply in politics and advocacy, and work synergistically with 
its employees, owners, and their other business interests. Its nimbleness 
means a founder can establish an LLC as a one-stop shop capable of doing 
everything she might want to achieve philanthropically within a single 
entity. Alternatively, the LLC’s almost endlessly flexible nature also 
allows it to serve as the coordinating vehicle for a philanthropic program 
that includes a variety of strategies, some of which can be pursued 
through other entities the LLC controls. The examples above show both 
models already in use. 
But operational flexibility is far from the LLC’s only advantage. An 
LLC also affords its founders abundant privacy, especially as compared 
to a tax-exempt nonprofit vehicle. For wealthy individuals keenly aware 
that information is power, the ability to disclose selectively is valuable 
indeed. Finally, an LLC structure empowers philanthropists who adopt it 
with virtually absolute control. LLC law imposes few mandates, and 
allows founders to design governance as they wish. They even hold the 
ultimate power to exit. If their generosity or their fortunes wane, 
philanthropy LLC founders can change their minds and reclaim their 
assets.
A. Operational Flexibility 
An LLC’s malleability would be a desirable feature all on its own, but 
this advantage is enhanced by an LLC’s ability to engage in so many and 
varied activities with very little regulation. In contrast, federal tax rules 
and state organizational law impose myriad limits on a nonprofit 
philanthropy’s investments and business relationships, harshly penalizing 
those who exceed them. Moreover, to retain tax exemption and avoid 
penalties, nonprofit philanthropic vehicles can engage in very limited 
political activity—some none at all. As Part IV will discuss, the lack of 
regulation of philanthropy LLCs does raise concerns for society. For their 
philanthropist founders, though, it is indisputably a selling point. 
Much of the comparative advantage of an LLC structure with respect 
to regulation lies in avoiding the federal tax code’s strictures for “private 
foundations,” a subcategory of § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations. 
The statutory and regulatory tests for designation as a private foundation 
are lengthy and complex.52 To summarize: A private foundation is (1) a 
                                                                                                                     
52. See JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 679–
704 (5th ed. 2015) (explaining the details of the tests over twenty-five densely packed pages); see 
also I.R.C. §§ 170, 509 (2018) (the statutes from which the tests arise). 
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nonprofit, § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization; (2) that is funded 
predominantly by a single or small set of donors; and (3) that pursues its 
mission primarily by enabling the efforts of other organizations rather 
than running its own charitable programs.53
Individuals or families desiring to establish a tax-exempt 
philanthropic vehicle of their own will almost always fall within this 
definition, rather than qualifying as less regulated and more tax-
advantaged “public charities.” The resulting organizations will therefore 
be subject to the restrictive private foundation rules.54 The limitations 
these rules impose span many topics, including investment practices, 
political activity, and relationships between the foundation and its leaders 
and donors. Had Chan and Zuckerberg formed a tax-exempt entity to 
distribute their wealth, it would have been deemed a private foundation 
and forced to contend with this army of restrictions.55 An LLC structure 
neatly avoids them. 
1. Investment Choices
Chan, Zuckerberg, and their precursors believe in the power of 
business as a force for good. They see the value their technology 
businesses have brought to society and believe many social problems can 
be solved by entrepreneurs. To that end, they see investment in social 
enterprises as an important component of their philanthropic programs. 
They are not alone. In a 2016 survey of wealthy donors, thirty-three 
percent of these high-net-worth individuals reported that they “participate 
                                                                                                                     
53. See FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 679–704 (5th ed. 2015); I.R.C. §§ 170, 
509 (2018). An LLC can seek tax-exempt status, but only if its members are § 501(c)(3) exempt 
organizations or governmental entities, a hurdle CZI and the other philanthropist-owned LLCs 
discussed here could not clear. See Keatinge, supra note 16, at 574 (describing these and other 
limitations).
54. Donors who establish a “donor-advised fund” account within a public charity, discussed 
infra at notes 196–201 and accompanying text, can escape some of the private foundation 
restrictions. 
55. Chan and Zuckerberg do have a private foundation, but it is not the coordinating vehicle 
for their philanthropic efforts. In 2016, the most recent year for which disclosures are available, 
it was used to make charitable contributions funded by transfers from CZI. See Chan Zuckerberg 
Foundation, Form 990-PF (2016), https://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2016/455/002/2016-
455002209-0e86d20b-F.pdf (showing the Foundation was the recipient of over $1 billion in 
Facebook stock from the Initiative and granted approximately $21 million to two public charities); 
see also supra notes 7–8 and 18–19 and accompanying text (describing the Primary School and 
the Biohub project). Filings for prior years show minimal contributions and grants. See Chan 
Zuckerberg Foundation Form 990-PF (2015), https://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2015/
455/002/2015-455002209-0d500d0b-F.pdf; Chan Zuckerberg Foundation Form 990-PF (2014); 
https://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2014/455/002/2014-455002209-0c175ef6-F.pdf
(showing the Guidestar report of this form, in the name of The Openness Trust, as the 2014 
disclosure of the Chan Zuckerberg Foundation).
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in impact investing.”56 Where an LLC offers philanthropists a wide berth 
to engage in this kind of blended investment activity, private foundations 
are subject to a raft of burdensome—sometimes even prohibitive—
regulatory restrictions.
Federal tax law most forcefully constrains private foundations’ 
investments by imposing serious, and potentially confiscatory, excise 
taxes on foundations that hold too large a stake in any business 
enterprise.57 The baseline rule allows foundations to hold up to twenty 
percent of a corporation’s voting stock.58 This ceiling can vary in either 
direction, depending on the circumstances. The permissible limit is 
reduced by the holdings of the foundation’s leaders or substantial 
contributors;59 it is increased to thirty-five percent if unrelated persons 
have “effective control” of the corporation in which the foundation 
invests.60 Private foundations that receive such excess business holdings 
by gift or bequest need not disclaim the assets or sell them in an 
immediate fire sale, but they must dispose of them within five years.61 If 
they do not, the excess holdings will be subject to a whopping 200% tax.62
This excess-business-holdings regime creates two different sorts of 
problems for entrepreneurs turned philanthropists. First, it can impose a 
timeline for relinquishing control over their companies. For those like 
Pierre Omidyar, who no longer owns anything close to twenty percent of 
eBay and stepped away from active control of the company years ago, 
relinquishing control is a nonissue.63 But founders in the Zuckerberg 
mold will fiercely resist divestiture. Zuckerberg is thirty-four years old 
and has no intention of giving up control of Facebook’s voting stock or 
daily business operations anytime soon.64 Yet much of his wealth is tied 
up in the company.65 He would need to donate his controlling interest to 
                                                                                                                     
56. U.S. TR. & THE LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, THE 2016 U.S. TRUST STUDY OF 
HIGH NET WORTH PHILANTHROPY: CHARITABLE PRACTICES AND PREFERENCES OF WEALTHY 
HOUSEHOLDS 77, http://www.ustrust.com/publish/content/application/pdf/GWMOL/USTp_
ARMCGDN7_oct_2017.pdf.
57. I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1).
58. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
61. Id. § 4943(c)(6). Under certain circumstances, a private foundation may obtain an 
additional five-year extension from the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 4943(c)(7).
62. Id. § 4943(b).
63. See Ed Lin, Pierre Omidyar Trims Stakes in eBay, PayPal, BARRON’S (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/pierre-omidyar-trims-stakes-in-ebay-paypal-1518632718.
64. See, e.g., Kathleen Chaykowski, How Facebook is Making Sure Zuckerberg Stays in 
Control Forever, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/
2016/04/27/how-facebook-is-making-sure-zuckerberg-stays-in-control-forever/#2b4d3ac4e97c.
65. Lisa Marie Segarra, Mark Zuckerberg Just Became the World’s Fifth Richest Person,
MONEY (July 27, 2017), http://time.com/money/4877281/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-worlds-
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his philanthropy to make good on his ninety-nine percent pledge.66 If the 
philanthropy was structured as a private foundation, in just a few years, 
the excess business holdings rules would require the foundation to sell 
this large stake in Facebook to investors over which Zuckerberg has no 
sway. 
Congress intended the rules to function this way—to combat concerns 
“that some foundation managers were investing foundation assets in 
enterprises in which their donors also had a personal interest and were 
operating them in a manner that provided more benefit to the donors than 
to the public.”67 Despite some strong criticism, the excess business 
holdings rules remain on the books.68 
This regime would understandably sour philanthropists like 
Zuckerberg on private foundations.69 Zuckerberg is set on remaining in 
control of Facebook.70 In fact, he was originally unwilling even to 
transfer his voting control over Facebook to the Initiative he and his wife 
fully control.71 (This is not so surprising considering that the LLC would 
eventually need to divest its shares to fund its charitable, investment, and 
political activities.) Soon after CZI’s founding, Zuckerberg proposed that 
the Facebook board reorganize the company’s capital structure.72 The 
                                                                                                                     
richest-person/.
66. See Zuckerberg, supra note 1 (discussing the ninety-nine percent pledge).
67. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 276; see also Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering 
Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59, 68–93 (2004) (comprehensively 
reviewing and critiquing the rationales behind the excess business holdings rules).
68. Newman’s Own Foundation, a frequent critic of the excess-business-holdings regime, 
narrowly failed to obtain an exemption from the excess- business-holdings regime for itself and 
other foundations like it as part of the 2017 tax legislation. See Ana Radelat, Tax Bill Glitch 
Endangers Future of Newman’s Own and Actor’s Foundation, CONN. MIRROR (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://ctmirror.org/2017/12/21/tax-bill-glitch-endangers-future-of-newmans-own-and-actors-
foundation/. It did not, however, have to wait long for another bite at the apple. This time was 
more successful, and the February 2018 Bipartisan Budget Act contains an exemption to the rules 
for foundations that: (1) own 100% of the business; (2) receive their holdings other than by 
purchase; (3) operate independently from the business enterprise; and (4) donate all of their profits 
to charity. See I.R.C. § 4943(g) (2018); see also Ana Radelat, Budget Deal has Plenty for 
Connecticut, CONN. MIRROR (Feb. 9, 2018), https://ctmirror.org/2018/02/09/senate-stumbles-on-
way-to-vote-on-budget-bill-with-plenty-for-ct/ (explaining that the exemption allowed 
Newman’s Own to avoid the 200% excess business holdings tax). The contributions planned by 
donors addressed here, however, would not fit within this new exemption.
69. Richard Schmalbeck predicted just such discomfort among self-made multimillionaires 
more than a decade ago. See Schmalbeck, supra note 67, at 105–06. He also expected such 
individuals to search for private foundation alternatives, see id. at 105–08, but he did not anticipate 
their use of philanthropy LLCs.
70. See Chaykowski, supra note 64.
71. See Erin Griffith, Mark Zuckerberg Controls Facebook and He Intends to Keep it That 
Way, FORTUNE (Apr. 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/27/zuckerberg-facebook-control/.
72. See id.
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new structure would have allowed him to donate large numbers of 
economically valuable but nonvoting shares to the Initiative while 
maintaining voting control of the company.73
Here’s how it worked. Facebook already had dual-class stock, with 
Class B shares owned by Zuckerberg and other executives enjoying a ten-
to-one voting advantage over publicly-traded Class A shares.74 The plan, 
which the board approved but delayed executing due to shareholder 
litigation,75 would have issued a dividend of two shares of a new Class C 
stock to each holder of either Class A or B shares.76 The Class C shares 
would have had the same economic rights as Class A and B shares, but 
no voting rights.77 After the dividend, Zuckerberg would have been able 
to donate his new Class C shares to CZI while maintaining control 
through his super-voting Class B holdings.78 The LLC could sell those 
Class C shares to institutional investors, mom and pop, or my Aunt 
Mary—it still wouldn’t undermine Zuckerberg’s control of Facebook. 
Not all entrepreneurs can use this particular dodge. Creating a dual-
class structure midstream is difficult.79 Some philanthropists will not 
helm companies that conveniently already have one in place—though the 
number of companies adopting them is large and growing, particularly in 
the tech field.80 Even philanthropists with a dual-class structure at their 
                                                                                                                     
73. See id.
74. See Kurt Wagner, How Can Zuckerberg Give Away All That Stock and Still Control 
Facebook?, RECODE (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.recode.net/2015/12/14/11621416/how-can-
mark-zuckerberg-give-away-stock-and-while-still-controlling.
75. See Second Stipulation and Order Governing Case Schedule at 3, In re Facebook, Inc. 
Class C Reclassification Litig., No. 122286-VCL (Del. Ch. Ct. Mar. 21, 2017) (“Facebook, Inc. 
shall not effect the amendment of its certificate of incorporation and stock reclassification that is 
the subject of this litigation during the pendency of proceedings in this Court.”). As explained 
below, events overtook the case, and it never went to trial. See Stipulation and Order Dismissing 
Action as Moot and Retaining Jurisdiction to Determine Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Application for an 
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 4, In re Facebook, Inc. Class C 
Reclassification Litig., No. 122286-VCL (Del. Ch. Ct. Sept. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Order 
Dismissing Action].
76. See Colin Stretch, Preserving Founder-Led Structure to Focus on the Long Term,
FACEBOOK (Apr. 27, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/04/q1-earnings-note/
(announcing the plan to shareholders).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. For example, while companies newly going public can adopt a dual-class structure, the 
NYSE restricts its listed companies from undertaking a midstream reclassification to create a dual-
class structure. See NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 313.00(A), 313.10 (2018), 
http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manual=%2F
lcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F.
80. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class 
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 594 (2017) (“[T]here has been an upward trend in the adoption of 
dual-class stock since Google went public with a dual-class structure in 2004 and was followed 
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disposal may be unable convince their boards to adopt a plan like 
Zuckerberg’s. It also remains to be seen if courts will balk at such moves, 
and the challenge to Facebook’s plan will not provide any answers. On 
the eve of trial in late September 2017, with his company under fire due 
to the Russian election meddling scandal, Zuckerberg asked the Facebook 
board to abandon it.81 It complied, and the court dismissed the case as 
moot.82
However the corporate law question is resolved, the nonvoting share 
gambit will not evade the excess-business-holdings regime. Section 4943 
treats nonvoting shares held by a private foundation as permitted holdings 
only so long its leaders and substantial contributors own no more than 
twenty percent of the voting stock.83 Zuckerberg and CZI could not have 
taken refuge in this safe harbor. The plan to develop and donate Class C 
shares was intended specifically to ensure Zuckerberg would remain in 
control of far more than twenty percent of Facebook’s voting shares. Had 
he created a private foundation, the excess business holdings rules would 
have required it to divest on the government’s timeline or turn over 
billions to the federal treasury. 
The excess-business-holdings regime also creates a second problem: 
impeding particular investment strategies. Consider Powell Jobs’ 
Emerson Initiative. Venture-capital-like investment is a major part of its 
activities, participating in over a dozen rounds of funding for social 
enterprise startups over the last five years—often as the lead investor.84
Emerson has also invested in more established firms that it believes will 
make an impact in its areas of interest. For example, in 2016 it acquired 
“a significant minority stake in Anonymous Content, the production and 
management company behind the Oscar-winning film Spotlight” to 
harness “the power of storytelling to shape our culture and improve 
lives.”85 Last year it bought majority control in The Atlantic.86 The 
                                                                                                                     
by well-known tech companies, such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, Snap, Trip Advisor, and 
Zynga.”).
81. See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/search/ 
top/?q=mark%20zuckerberg%20stock%20reclassification&filters_rp_author=%7B%22name%2
2%3A%22author%22%2C%22args%22%3A%224%22%7D (“I've asked our board to withdraw 
the proposal to reclassify our stock – and the board has agreed.”).
82. See Order Dismissing Action, supra note 75.
83. See I.R.C. § 4943 (2018); Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(2) (1977).
84. See Emerson Collective: Investments, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/ 
organization/emerson-collective/investments/investments_list#section-investments (last visited 
June 9, 2018).
85. Matthew Belloni, Laurene Powell Jobs Goes Hollywood, Buys Minority Stake in 
“Spotlight” Producer Anonymous Content, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 30, 2016, 7:37 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/laurene-powell-jobs-takes-minority-934139.
86. See White, supra note 33.
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precise stakes involved in these deals are often undisclosed, but when 
Emerson acts as lead investor, stakes over the excess business holdings 
limits will not be unusual.87 As an LLC, though, Emerson need not 
concern itself with these restrictions.
A philanthropy LLC means no regulatory regime will set the schedule 
for disposing of a founder’s stock in his or her company.88 Owners can 
contribute whatever assets they wish to their philanthropic ventures, and 
they may impose any time horizon they choose for divestiture. They can 
likewise opt to purchase positions of any size they desire in the investee 
companies they select. They can structure their investments based on the 
business and impact value of each deal, with no externally imposed 
regulatory ceilings. They sit, happily and unimpeded by regulation, in the 
driver’s seat.
But the headaches for private foundations seeking flexibility for their 
investment operations do not end with the excess business holdings rules. 
State law duties of care and prudence require their charitable fiduciaries 
to make investment decisions as would a prudent person, and often prize 
diversification.89 Section 4944 of the federal tax code doubles down on 
this idea. “If a private foundation invests any amount in such a manner as 
to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes,” excise taxes 
apply to both the entity and its management.90 Treasury regulations 
impose a standard of ordinary business care and prudence to avoid these 
penalties, which is applied investment-by-investment, as of the time the 
investment was made, and in relation to the foundation’s complete 
investment portfolio.91 These standards, and their heavy reliance on 
diversification, create serious risks for philanthropists planning to 
allocate much or all of their portfolios to impact investments—which can 
carry high risk, generate below-market financial return, or both. 
A number of factors considerably reduce these apparent hazards. The 
first is a statutory exception: “[I]nvestments, the primary purpose of 
which is to accomplish one or more [charitable purposes], and no 
significant purpose of which is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property, shall not be considered as investments which 
                                                                                                                     
87. Investments that qualify as program-related under I.R.C. § 4944, discussed infra notes 
92-96 and accompanying text, can escape the excess business holdings rules. As noted there, 
however, such investments must lack a financial motive and many investments philanthropy LLC 
adopters would like to make will not so qualify.
88. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(1) (1972) (stating the general requirements for discharge 
of excess business holdings, which apply only to private foundations and donor-advised funds).
89. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 189–95, 211–15.
90. I.R.C. § 4944 (b)(2) (2018) (imposing penalties ranging from five to twenty-five percent
of the amount of the jeopardizing investment).
91. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2).
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jeopardize the carrying out of exempt purposes.”92 Falling within this 
program-related investment (PRI) exception not only eliminates potential 
excise tax liability under Section 4944, but also allows a private 
foundation to count the excepted investment towards its required annual 
payout of five percent of its assets.93 Second, the addition of new 
regulatory examples in 2016, specifically blessed nineteen different types 
of transactions as qualifying PRIs.94 These examples clarify that PRIs 
may be made to for-profit entities, that they may be structured as debt or 
equity investments, and that a potentially high rate of return is not a 
disqualifier.95 The revised regulations also reinforce the requirement that 
all PRIs must be made with a primary purpose of accomplishing a 
charitable purpose, and frequently cite qualifying investments’ lack of 
appeal to other investors.96
Today’s PRI regulations offer comfort to private foundations 
considering certain types of impact investments. Yet the requirements 
that PRIs serve a primarily charitable purpose, not have a significant 
purpose to generate income, and not be investments a commercial 
investor would undertake remain stumbling blocks. It would be hard to 
defend an investment like Emerson’s in Anonymous Content as primarily 
charitable and without a financial motivation. The round of Neighborly 
Series A that it led was joined by social investors and pure venture capital 
funds.97 The PRI exception will not so easily accommodate investments 
like these. 
Of course, if an investment will not qualify as a PRI because it is too 
lucrative, the jeopardy investment regime may not present a problem. But 
impact investing for blended value can have a partially financial 
motivation that would disqualify it as a PRI while still presenting a risk 
profile or lack of diversification that could render it jeopardizing under 
§ 4944. The IRS provided reassuring guidance in 2015, stating:
When exercising ordinary business care and prudence in 
deciding whether to make an investment, foundation 
managers may consider all relevant facts and circumstances, 
                                                                                                                     
92. I.R.C. § 4944(c). Another statutory exception, which exempts donated investments 
from the diversification rules, would shield donated stock (but not investments chosen as part of 
a foundation’s own investment program) from scrutiny under Section 4944. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4944-1(a)(2)(ii)(a).
93. The foundation payout requirement is discussed in more detail infra notes 103–05 and 
accompanying text. 
94. See Treas. Reg. § 54.4944-3(b).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Jase Wilson, Neighborly Raised a Series A, NEIGHBORLY (May 16, 2017),
https://learn.neighborly.com/news/neighborly-raised-series/.
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including the relationship between a particular investment 
and the foundation’s charitable purposes. Foundation 
managers are not required to select only investments that 
offer the highest rates of return, the lowest risks, or the 
greatest liquidity so long as the foundation managers 
exercise the requisite ordinary business care and prudence 
under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of 
the investment in making investment decisions that support, 
and do not jeopardize, the furtherance of the private 
foundation’s charitable purposes.98
Language in the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act 
permitting fiduciaries making investment decisions to “consider the 
charitable purposes of the institution” in making their selections suggests 
the trend under state law will be similar.99
Private foundations are increasingly making impact investments a part 
of their endowment strategy. In one of the biggest commitments to date, 
the Ford Foundation announced last year it would devote up to one billion 
of its twelve-billion-dollar endowment to mission-related investments 
over the next ten years.100 In doing so, it explicitly credited the 2015 IRS 
guidance in resolving the “legal uncertainty” that had until its issue been 
a “barrier” to adopting such an approach.101 The Nathan Cummings 
Foundation has only about half a billion in endowment, but pledged in
2018 that it would align all of its investments with its mission.102 These 
important developments should eliminate private foundation concerns 
that investing that trades financial for social returns will per se violate 
federal tax law or state fiduciary obligations. 
The philanthropy LLC still affords its creators far greater flexibility 
and comfort. This model frees philanthropists to pursue whatever type 
and range of investments they wish. A philanthropy LLC can act like a 
venture capital fund, a private equity firm, or free-wheeling speculator. 
Moreover, it can do so with neither the anxiety nor the burden of proving 
these investments fit the PRI model or any other legal standard. 
                                                                                                                     
98. I.R.S. Notice 15-62, IRB 2015-39 (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-
15-62.pdf.
99. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(a), (e)(1)(H) (Nat’l 
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2006).
100. Darren Walker, Unleashing the Power of Endowments: The Next Great Challenge for 




102. See Nathan Cummings Foundation, Nathan Cummings Foundation Announces Move to 
100 Percent Mission-Aligned Investing, http://www.nathancummings.org/ncf-commits-100-
percent.
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Finally, using a philanthropy LLC structure gives a donor more 
freedom to determine how quickly her philanthropy will spend its assets. 
Tax rules require private foundations to distribute five percent of their 
assets annually to qualifying recipients (generally tax-exempt public 
charities),103 in an effort to prevent donors from using them to warehouse 
assets tax-free.104 Foundations who fail to meet this minimum 
distribution requirement again are subject to penalty taxes.105 Like the 
excess business holding rules, jeopardy investment prohibition, and 
nonprofit fiduciary law, these demands simply do not apply to a 
philanthropy LLC. Their founders are masters not only of how their 
philanthropies invest their assets, but of how and when they spend them.
2. Political Activity
The philanthropy LLC will also outperform the private foundation for 
philanthropists who see political action as pivotal to achieving their goals. 
Federal law106 checks the political activities of all tax-exempt charitable 
entities, and it most severely limits private foundations.107 Private 
foundations risk loss of exemption if they engage in substantial lobbying 
or any political campaign activity, and such activities also subject the 
foundation and its management to two-tiered penalty taxes.108 A twenty 
percent tax will be levied on any private foundation expenditures on 
lobbying or campaign activity,109 and willful and unreasonable 
expenditures expose foundation managers to an additional five percent 
tax.110 If the amount expended on prohibited activities is not returned to 
the foundation, further penalties of 100% for the foundation and fifty 
percent for foundation managers apply.111 Even voter registration drives 
                                                                                                                     
103. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2018).
104. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 272.
105. See I.R.C. § 4942 (a)–(b) (imposing first tier taxes of 30% of the undistributed amounts 
and second tier taxes of 100%).
106. State nonprofit corporation and charitable trust law rarely include explicit prohibitions 
on political activity, though such activity can preclude state property tax exemption. See Dana 
Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 28 (2011). As the 
sweeping prohibitions under federal tax law eclipse any state law in this area, the remainder of 
the Article will leave aside state law constraints on political activity.
107. Private foundations are not the only exempt category available to structure a 
philanthropic vehicle, but as noted earlier, they are the most likely classification of a § 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt philanthropic vehicle formed by the donors considered here.
108. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (“[N]o part of the net earnings of” a tax-exempt charitable entity 
may be used to “participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office.”); see also id. § 4945(d) (subjecting any lobbying
or campaign expenditure by a private foundation to prohibitive penalty taxes).
109. Id. § 4945(a), (d), (e).
110. Id. § 4945(a)(2).
111. Id. § 4945(b).
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/1
2018] DISRUPTIVE PHILANTHROPY 941
will trigger these hefty penalties, unless they are carefully constructed to 
avoid the appearance of partisanship.112 While foundation donors can 
conduct political activities on their own or through other entities they 
control, the foundation itself must stay far clear of them. 
These political restrictions would clearly frustrate donors like Powell 
Jobs, Chan, and Zuckerberg. The Emerson Collective touts its dedication 
to immigration and education reform.113 Powell Jobs even met personally 
with President Trump to advocate that immigration reform be done in a 
“thoughtful way.”114 From its inception, the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative 
has emphasized the importance of advocacy work to its objectives. Chan 
and Zuckerberg’s letter to Max articulated that “[w]e must participate in 
policy and advocacy to shape debates. Many institutions are unwilling to 
do this, but progress must be supported by movements to be 
sustainable.”115 It would be impossible to meet commitments like these 
using a tax-exempt private foundation alone, and running multiple 
organizations adds risk and expense.
Of course, tax-exempt organizations other than private foundations 
can accommodate a substantial amount of political activity,116 and 
politically oriented donors frequently use them for such purposes. Both 
social welfare organizations exempt under § 501(c)(4) and business 
leagues exempt under § 501(c)(6) can engage in unlimited lobbying, so 
long as it is relevant to their exempt purposes.117 These organizations can 
                                                                                                                     
112. Id. § 4945(d)(2), (f).
113. See Priorities, EMERSON COLLECTIVE, http://www.emersoncollective.com/about-us.
114. See Tony Romm, Laurene Powell Jobs and Senator Kamala Harris Are Worried About 
Trump and Immigration, RECODE (June 1, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/6/1/15694146/ 
laurene-powell-jobs-kamala-harris-california-senator-donald-trump-dreamers-code-2017.
115. Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
116. The baseline political restrictions allowing only insubstantial lobbying and no political 
campaign activity appear in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and apply only to private foundations and public 
charities organized under this section.
117. Treas. Reg. § 501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (providing that an organization 
“may qualify [for exemption] under section 501(c)(4) even though it is an action organization,” 
meaning it engages in lobbying); Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117 (stating that an organization 
may be exempt under section 501(c)(6) “even though its sole activity is directed to the influencing 
of legislation which is germane to such common business interest”). For comprehensive treatment 
of the tax consequences of political activity by social welfare organizations and business leagues, 
see JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, IRS, POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AND 
LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (C)(5), AND (C)(6) ORGANIZATIONS (2003),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf. For a discussion of the 501(c)(4) scandal that 
embroiled the IRS in 2013, see Evelyn Brody & Marcus Owens, Exile to Main Street: The I.R.S.’s
Diminished Role in Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 859 (2016). 
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also engage in political campaign activity so long as it does not become 
“primary.”118
But donors like Powell Jobs, Chan, and Zuckerberg would have little 
to gain from structuring their entities as social welfare organizations or 
business leagues. Social welfare entities are not eligible to receive tax-
deductible contributions. Contributions to business leagues are 
deductible only if they qualify as business expenses, which donations for 
lobbying or political campaign activity do not.119 These organizations can 
engage in political activity without imperiling their tax-exempt status, but 
doing so can reduce the value of the exemption. Both are taxed on the 
lesser of their political expenditures or their investment income.120 For 
founders who plan for their organization to conduct both social welfare 
or business league and political activities (carefully preventing political 
ones from becoming primary) and to have little or no investment income, 
this reduction in value will be small. For donors like those contemplated 
here, who will expect significant investment income to maintain their 
philanthropic venture’s real assets, the reduction is potentially 
substantial. These alternatives are useful structures for many types of 
political organizations, but they are not well-suited for donors seeking an 
organization devoted to combining charitable, investment, and significant 
political pursuits.121
Where exempt entities run into walls, LLCs open doors. A 
philanthropy LLC can do as much lobbying and political campaign 
activity its owners desire, so long as it complies with any relevant 
disclosure and campaign finance regulations. After Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission,122 even these limitations have been 
reduced. The LLC model is an elegant solution for donors who see 
political action as intertwined with their social goals. Combining this 
political capacity with the versatility to conduct and coordinate both 
charitable grants and impact investments further enhances the operational 
flexibility of the philanthropy LLC.
                                                                                                                     
118. See Rev. Rul. 81-95 (addressing 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations); I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969) (addressing 501(c)(6) business leagues). 
119. Tax treatment of donations – 501(c)(6) organizations, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/other-non-profits/tax-treatment-of-donations-501c6-organizations (last 
updated Apr. 2, 2018).
120. See I.R.C. § 527(f) (2018).
121. For a discussion considering a range of such structures, as well as donor-advised funds 
and supporting organizations, see Dana Brakman Reiser, Sharon Lincoln & Ingrid Mittermeier, 
Using Non-501(c)(3) Vehicles to Accomplish Philanthropic Objectives, 95 TAXES: TAX MAG. 41
(2017).
122. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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3. Coordination Across Entities
Nonprofit structures not only limit investment choices and political 
activity, but also regulate the relationships a philanthropic venture may 
have with its fiduciaries, its donors, and other entities either of them 
controls. Some of these restrictions derive from state law, others result 
from the private foundation rules of the federal tax code.
Nonprofit fiduciary concepts drawn from state nonprofit corporate 
and charitable trust law—here the duty of loyalty rather than that of care 
or prudence—limit compensation and other self-dealing transactions.123
A private foundation organized as a charitable trust must avoid being 
ensnared by trust law’s strict prohibitions on self-interested 
transactions.124 By contrast, an incorporated private foundation can 
generally prevent fiduciary liability by ensuring its compensation and 
other self-dealing transactions are fair, but independent review and 
documentation is advisable.125 Besting both, an LLC structure imposes 
hardly any limits on compensation or sharing of resources. Delaware 
LLCs can even waive fiduciary obligations.126
Federal tax law is stricter, especially so for private foundations. 
Allowing a foundation’s net earnings to inure to its insiders or bestowing 
a substantial private benefit on a third party risks loss of exemption.127
The private foundation excise taxes go even further. For example, they 
characterize any “sale or exchange, or leasing, of property” between a 
foundation and its directors, officers, substantial contributors, or entities 
they control as self-dealing.128 The self-dealing label, and its associated 
penalties, sticks even to transactions in which the foundation receives a 
fair-market deal–or better.129 Like in the other private foundation excise 
                                                                                                                     
123. See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate Directors—
Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1861–62 (2012).
124. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 195–97 (describing these prohibitions and the 
limited extent to which they can be eased).
125. See id. at 215–25 (explaining the common law and statutory approaches to fair dealing 
in nonprofit corporations).
126. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2018) (“To the extent that, at law or in 
equity, a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
liability company . . . , [these] duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions 
in the limited liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability company agreement 
may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). LLC laws in 
other jurisdictions are not always as accommodating as Delaware law, but still generally offer 
more flexibility than charitable forms. Ellen Aprill, Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, Single 
Member Limited Liability Companies, and Fiduciary Duties, 52 REAL PROPERTY, TRUST &
ESTATE L. J. 153, 161–81 (2017) (comparing LLC fiduciary law and fiduciary obligations in 
charitable entities).
127. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
128. See id. § 4941(d)(1)(A).
129. See id.
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tax regimes described above, these penalties charge foundations and their 
managers, and the transactions must be unwound to avoid second-order 
confiscatory taxes.130 Only deals in which a foundation receives property 
or services free of charge are safe.131
These rules will obviously hamper collaboration between a private 
foundation and its donor’s business ventures. The original plans for 
Google.org effectively demonstrate this lack of fit. The company saw 
great value in using its technology and personnel to achieve philanthropic 
goals. It announced it would use Google tools to track data from its 
demonstration fleet of rechargeable cars and to provide real-time disease 
warnings as part of its public health initiative.132 It also created a group 
within its engineering division to research renewable energy.133 But 
selling or leasing these resources to its private foundation for as little as 
one dollar would trigger self-dealing penalty taxes. Even sharing office 
space would be fraught. Perhaps Google might have been willing to 
provide all of these assets to its foundation gratis. Still, the deep 
connections between the company’s business and its foundation could 
risk exemption on grounds of private inurement or private benefit. Like 
establishing Google.org as an internal division of the for-profit Google, 
Inc., a philanthropy LLC avoids all of these concerns.
Compensation, too, becomes simpler. Since the philanthropies
explored here have taken the LLC route, the details of their compensation 
arrangements are not publicly available. We do know, though, that CZI 
plucked its early leadership from the highest levels of business, academia, 
and government. Plouffe, who left Uber to lead CZI’s policy efforts,134 is 
not the only example. CZI’s Chief Technology Officer came from 
Amazon, the president of its science organization hails from Rockefeller 
University, and the president of its education organization was a former 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Education.135 Perhaps some or all of these 
individuals were persuaded to join the Initiative by its grand and 
disruptive mission. Their talent and experience, however, would give 
them access to many lucrative opportunities, and some (if not all) surely 
had significant compensation requirements.
Even without knowing the particulars of their compensation, the 
comparatively higher administrative hurdles a nonprofit vehicle would 
have to clear to hire them are evident. State fiduciary law permits only 
                                                                                                                     
130. See id. § 4941(a)–(b).
131. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4941(d)–2(b)(2), 53.4941(d)–2(d)(3).
132. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 43, at 2443.
133. See id.
134. See Isaac, supra note 24.
135. See CHAN ZUCKERBERG INITIATIVE, supra note 26.
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reasonable compensation of a nonprofit director, trustee, or officer.136
The private foundation rules align to this standard, permitting 
compensation for fiduciaries, substantial contributors, and their related 
persons and entities only when it is “reasonable and necessary to carrying 
out the exempt purpose of the private foundation” and “not excessive.”137
Foundations can most easily prove compensation fits within these limits 
through careful consideration of comparability data and 
documentation.138 The 2017 tax legislation also adds a new twenty-one 
percent excise tax on compensation over $1 million paid by tax-exempt 
organizations.139
Had CZI been structured as a tax-exempt foundation, its top-flight 
hires would be subject to these restrictive compensation regimes. At the 
very least, to devise reasonable and nonexcessive compensation for them, 
a foundation’s board would need to obtain and examine comparability 
data and thoroughly document their decisions. In doing so, they would 
need to consider whether any salaries over the $1 million level would be 
worth triggering the excise tax. Once this process is complete, the 
foundation would also need to disclose the compensation it awards to its 
officers—as well as that paid to nonofficers among its five most highly 
compensated employees—to the IRS and to the public.140 The 
philanthropy LLC frees Chan and Zuckerberg from all these regulatory 
burdens and many prying eyes.
B. Privacy
Nonprofit philanthropic institutions must operate with a considerable 
amount of transparency. Private foundations and other tax-exempt 
entities must submit annual informational returns to the IRS, on its 
various Forms 990.141 These informational returns detail the 
organization’s operations and governance, including spending and the 
                                                                                                                     
136. See JACK B. SIEGEL, A DESKTOP GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND 
ADVISORS: AVOIDING TROUBLE WHILE DOING GOOD § 4.4(a) (2006).
137. I.R.C. § 4941(d)(2)(E) (2018).
138. See id.
139. See id. § 4960(c)(2)(a) (applying the tax only to such compensation to an entity’s five 
highest compensated employees).
140. See I.R.S., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 900-PF 27 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i990pf.pdf (describing the requirements for listing “Information About Officers, Directors, 
Trustees, Foundation Managers, Highly Paid Employees, and Contractors” on private 
foundations’ annual disclosures). 
141. See Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations File, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-
non-profits/form-990-series-which-forms-do-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in (last 
updated Aug. 4, 2017).
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names of various fiduciaries and employees.142 This and most of the other 
content of the Form 990 is available to the public. Some of the most 
sensitive information of all, the names and addresses of contributors, is 
kept confidential by the IRS—except in the case of private foundations 
and political organizations. Their donor lists are open to public 
inspection.143 States also often require registration and annual reporting 
by charitable entities operating within their borders, though many allow 
organizations to file federal Forms 990 with in lieu of state-specific 
forms.144 Disclosure requirements impose administrative costs, but more 
importantly, transparency intrudes on donors’ privacy. 
In stark contrast, for-profit philanthropic vehicles are screened from 
public scrutiny. If founders opt for a philanthropy LLC, the entity may 
not file any return whatsoever. The member of a single member LLC 
must simply report income from it on her own (confidential) return.145
LLCs consisting of multiple members will file partnership returns,146 but 
founders can again rely on tax confidentiality to protect the contents of 
these filings. For donors like the famously private Powell Jobs, as well as 
those who seek to shield some or all of their philanthropic activities from 
public scrutiny, the privacy benefits an LLC structure provides may 
outstrip any of its disadvantages.
C. Control
The final, powerful pull toward for-profit philanthropy is control. A 
philanthropy LLC or other for-profit structure will give donors something 
no nonprofit organizational form can offer—the ability to exit. The funds 
the Omidyars contribute to their charitable nonprofit are locked into the 
charitable stream.147 Even if they decide there is a better use for those 
                                                                                                                     
142. See, e.g., I.R.S., FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 7
(2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf; I.R.S., FORM 990-PF: RETURN OF PRIVATE 
FOUNDATION 6 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990pf.pdf.
143. See I.R.S., SCHEDULE B: SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTORS 5 (2017),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf. In July 2018, the IRS announced it would no longer 
require many non-charitable types of tax-exempt entities to provide it with information about their 
donors, but private foundations remain subject to donor disclosure to both regulators and the 
public. See Rev. Proc. 2018-38, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-18-38.pdf.
144. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 315–17.
145. See I.R.S., PUBLICATION 3402: TAXATION OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 2 (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3402.pdf.
146. See id.
147. This lock-in, sometimes called the “nondistribution constraint” is the defining 
characteristic of nonprofit organizations. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit 
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501 (1981) (coining the term).
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funds, the gift is irrevocable and both state organizational law and federal 
tax law bars returning those funds to the donors’ private use.148
Not so their LLC. To be clear, the Omidyars—and other philanthropy 
LLC adopters—have made no suggestion they ever plan to seek the return 
of their donated assets. All of their public statements depict the transfers 
to their LLCs as permanent and immutable, and they have given us no 
reason to doubt their intentions. Still, there is no legal constraint forcing 
their hands. LLC structures allow donors to change their minds and take 
back their toys. 
The control advantages of for-profit philanthropy also extend beyond 
the ability to exit. Governance arrangements are more flexible in a for-
profit, particularly in an LLC structure where a founder can be the sole 
member and wield complete control over the entity’s affairs and assets.
A nonprofit can be structured to maximize founder control using a 
charitable trust form with the founder as its sole trustee.149 This sole 
trustee will remain subject to fiduciary standards, however, and charitable 
fiduciary standards are more rigorous than those applicable to LLCs.150
As noted above, in some states LLC founders are even empowered to 
waive fiduciary obligations if they so choose.151 Donors keen to 
maximize their control over the philanthropic vehicles they create could 
not do better than an LLC. 
* * *
Perhaps counterintuitively, for-profit vehicles offer very attractive 
benefits to aspiring philanthropists. Many of these advantages arise by 
avoiding the multiple legal restrictions imposed on tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations, particularly on private foundations. Without these 
limitations, a philanthropy LLC can choose among unfettered investment 
options, engage deeply in politics, and structure its operations to take 
                                                                                                                     
148. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (defining tax-exempt charitable entities as those in 
which “no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual”); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01–.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008)
(prohibiting distributions in a popular uniform statute).
149. Although most jurisdictions, (and best practice) require multiple directors of a nonprofit 
corporation, single-trustee charitable trusts are widely permissible. See Evelyn Brody, Charity 
Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 645 (2005) (noting 
this disparity). The IRS also appears to disfavor tax-exemption for entities with few directors, 
although it does not have any specific authority to require particular governance practices for 
exempt entities. See Terri Lynn Helge, Rejecting Charity: Why the IRS Denies Tax Exemption to 
501(C)(3) Applicants, 14 PITT. TAX. REV. 1, 52–56 (2016) (reporting a study showing denials of 
exemption frequently cite a small number of directors as a concern).
150. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 187–88 (describing the fiduciary standards for 
charitable trustees and noting, their “strict” interpretation by courts).
151. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (2018).
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advantage of shared resources. It also can help donors safeguard their 
privacy and avoid public scrutiny, all while maintaining unparalleled 
control. These valuable benefits, however, do not come without costs—
either for individual donors or for society. The next Part will address the 
tax burdens a donor must bear when organizing a philanthropic endeavor 
as an LLC. After fully exploring the tradeoffs for donors, Part IV will 
consider the likelihood that these disruptive philanthropy structures will 
become more common, and examine the costs of this trend for the 
philanthropic sector and society at large.
III. THE (LIMITED) DOWNSIDE
To obtain the philanthropy LLC’s benefits of flexibility, privacy, and 
control, one might think donors must be willing to accept a very 
significant downside: higher taxes. Shouldn’t eschewing nonprofit, tax-
exempt alternatives also mean leaving behind the substantial income, gift, 
and estate tax benefits that come with them? If so, the sacrifice inherent 
in a philanthropy LLC structure might well prove too great for many to 
adopt. It turns out, however, that the real tax cost of adopting this 
disruptive philanthropy structure is surprisingly limited.
A. Income Tax Advantages 
Nonprofit, tax-exempt philanthropies receive two distinct types of 
income tax advantages. The first is self-evident: The income these entities 
generate is largely, if not entirely, invulnerable to taxation.152 Public 
charities receive the most extensive tax-exemption; only their unrelated 
business income is subject to taxation.153 Even when tax exemption is not 
absolute, exempt entities pay tax on small slices or segments of their 
income compared with taxable alternatives.154
The second type of advantage accrues not to tax-exempt entities 
themselves, but to their donors. Qualifying charitable donations can 
reduce a taxpayer’s overall income tax bill. This effect proceeds most 
directly through the charitable contribution deduction. In just the same 
fashion as other deductions, an itemizing taxpayer may subtract her 
charitable contributions from her adjusted gross income in determining 
her taxable income.155 By reducing the income figure to which the 
                                                                                                                     
152. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (describing various types of tax-exempt entities). 
153. See id. § 501(c)(3) (setting forth income tax exemption for charitable entities); id. § 511 
(imposing tax on unrelated business income of charitable organizations).
154. See, e.g., id. § 4940 (imposing a two percent excise tax on private foundations’ net 
investment income); id. § 527(f) (imposing tax on the lesser of social welfare organization’s 
political campaign expenditures or investment income). 
155. See id. § 170(b). As many discussions of the 2017 tax legislation addressed, the benefits 
of the charitable contribution deduction are only available to taxpayers who itemize. See Megan 
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taxpayer’s tax rate is applied, charitable deductions decrease the total 
amount of tax to be paid. Also, like any tax benefit structured as a 
deduction, the deduction for charitable contributions increases in value 
with the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer.156 The higher one’s income, 
the more tax will be avoided for a contribution of the same amount. 
Charitable contributors of appreciated property receive an additional 
benefit. Typically, when a taxpayer owns appreciated property and sells 
it, realizing a return, she must pay tax on the appreciation over her tax 
basis in the asset.157 Yet donors of appreciated property to qualifying 
charitable recipients need not recognize, and pay tax upon, their capital 
gains.158 Neither will the recipient.159 The charity can sell the appreciated 
asset for a profit, and its tax-exempt status will protect the return on this 
transaction from taxation.
A philanthropy LLC itself qualifies for neither tax-exemption nor 
deductibility.160 Consider CZI. If the Institute earns income on its 
investments in Andela or Meta and that income is passed through to CZI’s 
owners, Zuckerberg, and Chan, it will be taxable to them.161 Likewise, 
                                                                                                                     
O’Neil & Dan Parks, Tax Law Eliminates Giving Incentive for 21 Million Americans, Study Says,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Tax-Law-Wipes-
Out-Giving/242227. For those who take the standard deduction instead—a group which is 
expected to expand significantly when the standard deduction nearly doubles in 2018—the tax 
code’s incentive for charitable contributions are irrelevant. See id. This impact has many in the 
charitable sector worried, as some researchers have estimated the increased standard deduction 
will lead to a significant drop in charitable giving. See id.
156. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 345 (1972) (explaining this “unusual” facet of the charitable contribution deduction).
157. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
158. Id. § 170(e). The Trump administration’s plan to allow taxpayers to increase their basis 
for inflation when calculating capital gains to be taxed would reduce, but not eliminate this 
benefit. See Alex Daniels, Nonprofits Fear Impact of Trump Administration Plan to Cut Capital-
Gains Tax, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 2, 2017).
159. Id.
160. See id. §§ 170(c), 501(c).
161. Although philanthropy LLC owners like Chan and Zuckerberg may benefit from the 
reduced tax rates on their individual incomes that apply starting in 2018, they are unlikely to 
qualify for the new twenty-percent deduction on pass-through income. See I.R.C. § 199A. The 
shape of this provision is quite murky as yet, but philanthropy LLC owners will have at least two 
strikes against them in attempting to claim it. See Ken Berry, 2018 Tax Reform: Pass-Through 
Income Deduction More Complex Than Thought, CPA PRAC. ADVISOR (Jan. 8, 2018),
http://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/news/12389903/2018-tax-reform-pass-through-income-
deduction-more-complex-than-thought. First, the business of a philanthropy LLC may well be 
deemed a “specified service business”; eligibility for the deduction based on income from these 
businesses phases out entirely at $415,000 for joint filers. See id. (explaining that above this 
threshold, “you get no deduction—period”). Second, even if income falls below this rate, the 
deduction is further limited for high earners based on the size of the company’s payrolls or its 
depreciable business property—neither of which may be large for a philanthropy LLC with a 
small staff and no depreciable assets. See id. (providing the details on these restrictions). More 
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when the couple donates funds or assets to CZI, they will not be able to 
take a deduction for this contribution in computing their annual income 
taxes. 
These sacrifices are not as great at it might first appear, however. On 
the tax-exemption side, it is important to remember that exemption is only 
of value to the extent that there is income to tax. CZI and its owners do 
not purport to have income-generating goals. Quite the opposite. They 
plan to make often risky impact investments and give money away to 
charities and political causes. If the losses CZI generates are roughly on 
pace with the returns on its investments, there will be little income to be 
allocated to Chan and Zuckerberg, and on which they will have to pay 
tax.
The pass-through nature of a philanthropy LLC also mutes the initial 
loss of the deductibility advantage. When CZI makes grants to donees 
qualified to receive tax-deductible contributions, these deductions will 
flow through to its member-owners. As such, whatever portion of the $3 
billion it ultimately grants to § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charities in its 
medical research program will generate potential tax deductions for 
Zuckerberg and Chan.162
These deductions will only be potential tax deductions because all 
charitable contribution deductions are subject to percentage limitations. 
Donors to tax-exempt public charities can deduct only up to sixty percent 
of their annual income based on their cash charitable contributions and 
only up to thirty percent of their contributions of appreciated property.163
Somewhat lower percentage limits apply to contributions to private 
foundations: thirty percent for cash contributions and twenty percent for 
appreciated property.164 Even more importantly, the value of the 
deduction for appreciated property also varies by the type of gift and type 
of tax-exempt recipient. Gifts of appreciated property (except gifts of 
                                                                                                                     
clarity will come when the IRS issues guidance and regulations on the new deduction provision, 
but at this point, access to the new pass-through deduction does not appear to be a significant 
reason to elect the philanthropy LLC structure. 
162. Unless it could qualify as an S corporation, see I.R.C. § 1361, a philanthropy organized 
as a business corporation would be less tax efficient than an LLC. Corporate tax treatment always 
raises the specter of double taxation, whereby the entity’s income is taxed once through the 
corporate income tax as earned and again through the individual income tax when distributed to
owners. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 1.10 (3d ed. 
2011). Charitable contributions by the philanthropic entity also would generate corporate 
deductions only up to a ten-percent ceiling and would not pass through for use by individual 
owners at all. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2). Although the 2017 tax legislation reduced corporate rates, 
for entities dedicated to philanthropy, these differences will likely swamp the potential value of 
rate reduction.
163. See I.R.C. § 170(b)–(d).
164. See id.
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over ten percent of the stock of a single corporation) to public charities 
generate deductions for the full fair market value of the asset; the same 
gift to a private foundation will often generate a stepped down deduction 
reduced for the donor’s unrecognized capital gains.165
Philanthropy LLC donors can preserve much of the value of the tax 
treatment of charitable contributions of appreciated property. This is 
hugely important for founders like Chan and Zuckerberg, who plan to 
fund their LLC with stock.166 When Zuckerberg contributes his vastly 
appreciated Facebook stock to CZI in exchange for membership interests, 
the transaction will not wipe out his gains as would the same contribution 
to a tax-exempt public charity. But the transaction also will not be a 
taxable event.167 The stock will continue be Zuckerberg’s asset until the 
LLC disposes of it. 
If the LLC sells the stock, realizing a return, the gains (and associated 
tax burden) would flow through to the owners. CZI, though, will often 
have a much better option. When the funds it would generate through sale 
of Facebook stock would be used to make grants to tax-exempt public 
charities, it can simply grant them the Facebook stock instead. The 
charitable recipients can then sell the stock tax-free. The donors (Chan 
and Zuckerberg through CZI) avoid the tax on appreciated value and 
obtain any available deduction. In theory, the percentage limits and lack 
of a full market value deduction for donations to private foundations 
could enable a transfer of appreciated assets to a philanthropy LLC 
followed by a speedy donation to a public charity to yield a greater tax 
benefit than the same transfer to a private foundation. Even outside of this 
scenario, an LLC offers donors the ability to stage donations to take 
maximum advantage of deductibility.
Comparing the philanthropy LLC strategy with conventional 
alternatives yields less of a contrast than the initial categories of taxable 
and tax-exempt would suggest. The income of a philanthropy LLC will 
be taxable to its owners, but those owners have significant control over 
how much will be earned and distributed. Contributions to found or fund 
a philanthropy LLC will not be tax-deductible, but the grants the LLC 
makes can generate deductions for its founder-owners. Prudent planning 
will even allow them to take considerable advantage of the preferential 
tax treatment of charitable gifts of appreciated property. In addition, with 
the subset of donors under consideration here, income tax deductions like 
these may simply not figure into their decision-making at all. Many will 
                                                                                                                     
165. Compare I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C), with § 170(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii), (e)(5). Note that 
§ 170(e)(5) does allow a full market value deduction for donations of “qualified appreciated 
stock” to private foundations. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(5).
166. Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
167. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
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have made prior charitable contributions that have maxed out their 
percentage limitations for the foreseeable future, especially if they are 
engaged in tax planning to keep their incomes relatively low.
Tax preferences for charities are also not set in stone.168 The 2017 tax 
legislation did not directly target the charitable deduction, but the 
increase in the standard deduction will shift many taxpayers from 
itemizers to nonitemizers, the latter of whom gain no benefit from the 
charitable deduction, thereby significantly undermining the tax benefits 
of donating to nonprofit entities.169 The legislation’s reduction of tax rates 
simultaneously reduces the value of charitable deductions for those 
donors who continue to itemize and take them. In the past, some 
reformers have even advocated narrowing the types of organizations that 
qualify for tax-exemption.170 Donors considering disruptive philanthropy 
face a dynamic income tax environment, and are wise to discount the 
benefits of the current system in light of possible future changes.
B. Gift Tax Advantages 
Income tax implications are not the only ones relevant to traditional 
philanthropy, and that philanthropy LLC adopters would seem destined 
to lose. The gift tax applies to any “transfer of property by gift,”171 for 
less than full consideration. It subjects these transfers to tax rates as high 
as forty percent.172 Gifts to tax-exempt charitable entities like private 
foundations, however, avoid this potentially significant tax bite.173
Donors can deduct these contributions from the total amount of their gifts 
upon which the annual tax is levied, and this deduction is subject to no 
percentage or other limitations.174 Essentially, gifts to charity are tax-
exempt. But a gift to one of the philanthropy LLCs discussed here cannot 
qualify for this exemption, and thus seems to portend sizable gift tax bill 
for donors.
                                                                                                                     
168. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF 
CHARITABLE GIVING (2011) (analyzing various alternatives for charitable tax reform).
169. See Ann Carrns, Charities Fear Tax Bill Will Cut Giving, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017)
at B5 (“A higher standard deduction means fewer taxpayers will itemize their deductions on their 
tax returns, reducing the incentive to give to charities”); O’Neil & Parks, supra note 155
(“Nonprofit advocates are deeply worried about the impact of the tax law, especially the doubling 
of the standard deduction for individual taxpayers. As a result of that provision, many Americans 
will stop itemizing their taxes and will no longer get any tax benefit for charitable giving.”).
170. See, e.g., John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax-Exemption for NonProfit 
Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 2–9 (1992) (describing early 
1990s debate over imposing charity care requirements for hospitals to retain tax exemption).
171. I.R.C. § 2501.
172. See id. § 2001(c) (imposing graduated rates up to forty percent).
173. See id. § 2522(a)(2).
174. See id. Contributions to § 501(c)(4) and § 501(c)(6) entities are also exempt from gift 
taxation. See id. § 2501(a)(6).
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A transfer of assets to a philanthropy LLC, though, should actually be 
irrelevant for gift tax purposes. Such a transaction is no gift at all. In 
return for transfers of assets to their philanthropy LLCs, philanthropists 
like Chan, Zuckerberg, Omidyar, and Powell Jobs receive memberships, 
which vest in them ownership of the entity. In other words, these are 
transfers for consideration. As such, philanthropy LLC founders should 
avoid gift taxation just as founders of a small business do not pay gift tax 
on their transfers of assets to the LLC or corporation organized to operate 
their ventures. Of course, a philanthropic institution is a very odd type of 
business—one which professes its desire to give away all or most of its 
assets over time. The IRS might question whether the economic 
substance of transfers to these unusual entities is properly understood to
provide consideration. The cards appear heavily stacked in philanthropy 
LLC owners’ favor, though. They obtain control rights in return for the 
assets they transfer to the entities they create, and these control rights 
include the right to take back the assets should they decide to do so. It is 
hard to see such a quid pro quo as a gift. 
In the unlikely event the non-gift argument is unavailing, philanthropy 
LLC founders could also use other arguments to avoid gift taxation. One 
applies only to single-member LLCs, which are disregarded entities 
under tax law;175 an LLC with two or more members is instead treated as 
a pass-through.176 When an individual gives assets to her own single-
member LLC, there is no gift taxable event at all. The recipient entity is 
disregarded, and tax law responds as if the donor made no transfer, and 
thus, no gift.177 A single-member philanthropy LLC founder can handily 
adopt this argument to backstop the earlier one about transfers for 
consideration.
Of course, many donors—even among our small group of case 
studies—do not act alone. If a donor transfers assets to an LLC with two 
or more members and the transfer is deemed gratuitous, it would be 
recognized for gift tax purposes just as if the transfer were made to a 
partnership or corporation, unless the two members are spouses. The 
unlimited marital deduction shelters all transfers between spouses from 
the gift tax.178 Moreover, under a 2006 Revenue Procedure, those spouses 
                                                                                                                     
175. See I.R.S., supra note 145, at 2.
176. See id.
177. Note, however, that the disregarded nature of a single-member LLC cannot be used to 
defeat the gift tax if an LLC owner gifts her interests in an LLC to a taxable individual or entity. 
See Pierre v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 24, 35–36 (2009). 
178. I.R.C. § 2523(a).
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in a community property state (like California) can create single member 
(and thereby disregarded entity) LLCs.179
The potential for tax reform is less relevant here, as even the sweeping 
changes in the 2017 tax legislation largely neglected specific gift tax 
reforms.180 If the gift tax were swept away by another tax housecleaning 
effort, any lingering concerns that founding a philanthropy LLC could 
trigger it would disappear as well. But that seems unlikely. Even without 
any changes, however, philanthropy LLC founders have little to fear from 
the gift tax. Its apparent dangers for donors who take this route vanish on 
closer inspection. As transfers in return for consideration, asset transfers 
to philanthropy LLCs should entirely avoid characterization as gifts. 
Failing that, the marital deduction and LLCs’ ability to operate as 
disregarded entities offer additional routes to defer or avoid gift taxation. 
C.  Estate Tax Advantages
Nobody, of course, can avoid death. Of the tax burdens that choosing 
a for-profit vehicle for one’s philanthropy will inflict, one might presume 
the estate tax would be the most tenacious. The federal regime taxes “the 
transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident 
of the United States,” with top rates again at forty percent.181 A credit 
doubled by the 2017 tax legislation fully shields over $11 million in 
assets, but (absent truly shocking reversals) the donors contemplated here 
will die with assets that vastly exceed that threshold.182 As for gift 
taxation, deathtime transfers to private foundations and public charities 
                                                                                                                     
179. See Revenue Procedure 2002-69, FIRST AM. EXCHANGE CO., https://firstexchange.com/
revenue-procedure-2002-69/ (last visited June 9, 2018).
180. The two changes worked by the 2017 legislation were to increase from $14,000 to 
$15,000 the amounts that may be excluded from determining gifts subject to taxation annually 
and essentially doubling the lifetime credit for gift, estate and generation-skipping taxes. See
generally Allyson Versprille, Gift Tax Tweaks Could Lead to Unsavory Avoidance Tactics,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.bna.com/gift-tax-tweaks-n57982086495/ (discussing
changes to the tax code). The latter change, to the unified credits for both inter vivos and deathtime 
gratuitous transfers, will be discussed in the next section on the estate tax.
181. See I.R.C. § 2001(a), (c). 
182. The credit is actually a unified one, that includes both death and lifetime gratuitous 
transfers. For 2017, it was $5,490,000. See Estate Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
small-businesses-self-employed/estate-tax/ (last updated May 9, 2018). Changes under the 2017 
tax legislation raised it to over $11 million for 2018. Id. Spouses can combine their credits to 
double these amounts. Ashlea Ebeling, IRS Announces 2018 Estate and Gift Tax Limits: $11.2 
Million, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2017, 1:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017/
10/19/irs-announces-2018-estate-and-gift-tax-limits-11-2-million-per-couple/#6bb999ca4a4b. It 
is always worth noting that this credit means very few estates pay any estate tax whatsoever, but 
the potential founders of philanthropy LLCs are among the lucky few who will likely die with 
estates large enough to surpass the available credits and remain subject to the tax. 
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are fully deductible, with no percentage or other limitations.183 Assets 
transferred to traditional nonprofit philanthropic organizations will not 
count as part of the estate on which the tax is levied.184
A donor’s interest in a philanthropy LLC receives no such immunity 
and will be a part of her taxable estate. But again, preparation offers a 
way out. To avoid taxation, a philanthropy LLC founder need only create 
an estate plan that transfers the assets remaining in her LLC at her death 
in a way that qualifies for an available deduction. There are at least two 
ready options. Any assets a taxpayer transfers to his or her surviving 
spouse on death qualify for the unlimited marital deduction.185 Assets 
transferred on death to a tax-exempt public charity or private foundation 
also qualify for an unlimited charitable deduction.186 Married 
philanthropy LLC founders will likely find it useful to deploy these tools 
seriatim, providing for those assets they wish to remove from their 
taxable estates to transfer to the surviving spouse on the death of the first 
to die, and on the death of the survivor to a tax-exempt entity. An estate 
plan including one’s philanthropy LLC holdings in transfers like these 
elegantly defangs estate tax concerns.
Deathtime transfers do still expose one of the philanthropy LLC’s 
unavoidable limitations. A private foundation can hold a family’s assets 
through generations without any application of the estate tax. A
philanthropy LLC cannot function as such a perpetual tax-free vehicle,
which might transmit a family’s philanthropic values over time and future 
generations. To avoid the estate tax, those with assets over the credit 
amounts will need to transfer their LLC stakes to exempt entities on 
death, or pay Uncle Sam his share. 
Forsaking perpetuity will not matter much to the growing group of 
philanthropists who have proclaimed their intention to spend down their 
assets prior to death.187 This view of depleting one’s philanthropic assets 
as a key goal contrasts with the vision of creating a perpetual endowment 
                                                                                                                     
183. See I.R.C. § 2055; see also RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAXATION 5–59 (9th ed. 2013) (“The estate tax charitable deduction . . . is unlimited in the sense 
that it is not subject to percentage restrictions such as those applicable to the income tax deduction 
for contributions to charity.”).
184. See I.R.C. § 2055.
185. See id. § 2056(a).
186. See id. § 2055.
187. See FRANCIE OSTROWER, LIMITED LIFE FOUNDATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, EXPERIENCES,
AND STRATEGIES 9–12 (2009), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30121/ 
411836-Limited-Life-Foundations-Motivations-Experiences-and-Strategies.PDF; see also
Veronica Dagher, The Rise of Spend-Down Philanthropy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-of-spend-down-philanthropy-1397242743 (reporting 
findings from Bridgespan Group study). But see generally JOEL L. FLEISCHMAN, PUTTING WEALTH 
TO WORK: PHILANTHROPY FOR TODAY OR INVESTING FOR TOMORROW? (2017) (mounting a 
forceful critique of the spend-down philosophy).
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typical of earlier generations of donors. The modern cachet of spending 
down also makes the philanthropy LLC’s inability to promise a perpetual 
estate-tax-sheltered home for assets less problematic. 
It is worth noting that estate planning makes sense even for donors 
who strongly believe in spending down. The future is always uncertain. 
At the moment, Powell Jobs, the Omidyars, Chan, and Zuckerberg are 
alive and well, but life is unpredictable. And they will not be the first to 
learn that it can be surprisingly difficult to spend large amounts of money. 
Tax-avoiding transfers can be planned later if it becomes clear that a 
spend-down goal will be unattainable during a founder’s lifetime, or as 
the founders of a philanthropy LLC age or see their health falter. But 
better safe than sorry. Founders should execute an estate plan directing 
their LLCs’ holdings to a spouse, a tax-exempt charity, or both, just in 
case. 
Of course, a gambler might bet on a total repeal of the estate tax. 
Although the cost of funding other tax cuts made eliminating the estate 
tax impossible in 2017, there is no reason to believe this concession has 
changed conservatives’ devotion estate tax repeal.188 Savvy donors must 
at least account for the possibility that repeal eventually will render the 
estate tax charitable contribution deduction superfluous, regardless of the 
forms their philanthropic ventures take. 
* * *
The philanthropy LLC sounds at first like a very expensive—if not
foolish—strategy. Close review, however, reveals that with careful 
planning a philanthropy LLC is a very attractive alternative to the heavily 
regulated, public, and permanent version of philanthropy tax-exempt 
structures present. The real tax costs a philanthropy LLC imposes are 
simply not as large as one might suppose. The very high-profile and 
sophisticated donors profiled here are willing to tolerate these costs in 
exchange for enhanced flexibility, privacy, and control. If tax regimes 
continue to shift in ways that reduce the benefits of adopting a traditional 
nonprofit vehicle, the appeal of this kind of disruptive philanthropy will 
only increase.
                                                                                                                     
188. See Speaker Paul Ryan, First Major Speech on Tax Reform at the National Association 
of Manufacturers 2017 Manufacturing Summit (June 20, 2017), https://www.speaker.gov/press-
release/full-text-speaker-ryans-first-major-speech-tax-reform (claiming that as part of its tax 
reform agenda, Congress “will eliminate harmful, burdensome taxes including the death tax”); 
then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump, An America First Economic Plan: Winning the Global 
Competition, Remarks on Repealing the Death Tax at the Detroit Economic Club (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/08/trump-economic-speech-detroit/) (promising, while on the 
campaign trail, that “no family will have to pay the death tax”). 
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IV. THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR
There are only so many Silicon Valley tech fortunes. If the 
philanthropy LLC can only appeal to this extremely select group, it would 
be hard to call it a trend. But there are good reasons to believe this 
innovation will spread to potential donors further down the high net worth 
chain. Although these very wealthy individuals will not necessarily share 
the penchant for disruption of West Coast tech startup founders, many of 
the characteristics that make the philanthropy LLC attractive to the 
Zuckerbergs of the world will also entice the millionaire next door.189
A. The Likelihood of Adoption
There are more extremely wealthy individuals and families than the 
average Jane struggling to save for retirement might imagine. A 2017 
global report found over 225,000 “ultra high-net-worth individuals:”190
those with over $30 million in investable assets.191 The total number grew 
3.5% from the prior year’s tally, and more than 73,000 of these 
individuals reside in the United States.192 Looking to those (only) “high-
net-worth individuals”—with a (measly) one million dollars or more in 
investable assets—yields a bumper crop of potential philanthropy LLC 
adopters. A 2017 report estimates this group to be over 16.5 million 
strong globally, with nearly 5.2 million in the U.S. alone.193
Together, these wealthy individuals and families control trillions of 
dollars of assets, and large portions of this wealth will predictably be 
dedicated to philanthropic pursuits. For example, the annual Giving USA 
Report found donors contributed roughly $40 billion to private 
foundations in 2016.194 If the attraction of the philanthropy LLC is its 
relative advantages compared with a private foundation, there is 
considerable market share for it to gain.
Whether the many millionaires next door will be swayed to adopt a 
philanthropy LLC structure will depend primarily on their assessment of 
                                                                                                                     
189. This term was popularized by Thomas J. Stanley in his book of the same name. See
generally THOMAS J. STANLEY, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR (1996) (repeatedly using the term 
“millionaire next door”).
190. See WEALTH X, WORLD ULTRA WEALTH REPORT 2017, 1, https://www.wealthx.com/
report/exclusive-uhnwi-analysis-the-world-ultra-wealth-report-2017/#downloadform.
191. See id.; see also Ultra High Net Worth Individual (UHNWI), INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/ultra-high-net-worth-individuals-uhnwi.asp (last visited 
June 9, 2018) (“Ultra high-net-worth individuals (UHNWI) are people with investable assets of 
at least $30 million . . . .”).
192. See WEALTH X, supra note 190, at 22.
193. See CAPGEMINI, WORLD WEALTH REPORT 2017, 7, https://www.capgemini.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/worldwealthreport_2017_final.pdf.
194. See See the Numbers – Giving USA 2017 Infographic, GIVING USA (June 12, 2017),
https://givingusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Giving-USA-2017-Infographic.jpg.
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the tradeoff discussed above. For high-net-worth individuals with a lower 
profile than the Silicon Valley tech elite, privacy may not be so critical. 
Part of the mystique of unmasking the “millionaire next door” was that 
nobody knew about them.195 Their anonymity may make transparency a 
nonissue. Alternatively, it could make privacy ever more valuable. It is 
fair to assume that millionaires’ tastes for privacy will vary. Some of
these potential philanthropists will care little about the privacy the LLC 
structure offers, others will value being spared the spotlight; still others 
will want to showcase some of their philanthropic efforts and keep others 
to themselves. Whatever one’s personal preferences around privacy, the 
appeal of flexibility and control are universal.
The tremendous growth of donor-advised funds bolsters this 
intuition.196 Unlike a private foundation, a donor-advised fund is not a 
standalone philanthropic institution, but rather a separate account within 
a preexisting public charity.197 When a donor contributes assets to her 
account, the public charity receives and holds them, and the donor may 
take a current deduction for her contribution.198 She may also provide 
nonbinding advice on both how the fund’s assets should be invested and 
to whom grants from it should ultimately be made.199
Donor-advised funds preserve donors’ deductibility benefits while 
being less expensive to establish and maintain than private 
foundations.200 They avoid many, though not all, of the private 
foundation rules’ restrictions.201 They are also more private. Although the 
public charity of which a donor-advised fund is a part remains within 
federal and state regulators’ purview, individual donor-advised funds are 
subject to no such oversight. On the down side, a donor-advised fund does 
                                                                                                                     
195. See STANLEY, supra note 189, at 30 (explaining that the typical American millionaire 
appear to their neighbors as “nondescript, middle class folks”).
196. See Roger Colinvaux, Donor Advised Funds: Charitable Spending Vehicles for 21st 
Century Philanthropy, 92 WASH. L. REV. 39, 40 (2017) (reporting various indicators of this 
growth, including the fact that “an astonishing five of the top eleven recipients for charitable gifts 
in the United States are sponsoring organizations of donor advised funds”).
197. See I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2) (2018) (providing the tax definition of “donor-advised fund”); 
see also Colinvaux, supra note 196, at 43–44 (describing donor-advised funds in an article 
analyzing the major policy questions they raise).
198. See Colinvaux, supra note 196, at 43–44.
199. See I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii) (2018) (defining a donor-advised fund to include “a fund 
or account . . . with respect to which a donor . . . has, or reasonably expects to have, advisory 
privileges with respect to the distribution or investment of amounts held in such fund or account 
by reason of the donor’s status as a donor”).
200. In fact, because donor-advised fund contributions are treated as made to public charities, 
they typically offer greater deductibility benefits than would a private foundation. See Colinvaux, 
supra note 196, at 52–53.
201. For example, under reforms included in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, donor-
advised funds are subject to the private foundation excess-business-holdings regime. See I.R.C. 
§ 4943(e).
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not allow a donor to create her own institution, staff it, and set its 
priorities, and she must relinquish ultimate control over the assets it 
holds. That said, donor advice tends to be powerful and rarely ignored. A 
donor-advised fund can be seen as a private foundation “lite” or a kind of 
(not very) poor man’s private foundation. Although the pros and cons of 
donor-advised funds and philanthropy LLCs differ, those who opt for 
donor-advised funds make their decisions using the same kind of cost–
benefit analysis that predicts wider adoption of the philanthropy LLC.
Perhaps the freedom from regulation the philanthropy LLC offers will 
also be particularly attractive to individuals with only somewhat smaller 
fortunes to devote to philanthropy. After all, a mere multimillionaire 
should think more carefully about the extra costs of compliance a private 
foundation entails than should Priscilla Chan. The same is true, though, 
when considering the forgone tax benefits attendant to these
philanthropic vehicles. The philanthropy LLC structure can trim these 
costs considerably, but not entirely eliminate them. The somewhat less
staggeringly wealthy will have a smaller cushion to cover the relatively 
higher tax burden of a philanthropy LLC. Those millionaires anxious to 
avoid sending any extra dollars to the IRS also will not easily be 
converted to disruptive philanthropy. For those high-net-worth 
individuals willing to tolerate somewhat higher tax bills, though, the 
philanthropy LLC’s extensive freedom to invest, manage and advocate 
as they choose will be a draw.
Some high-net-worth donors have already demonstrated their 
willingness to sacrifice tax benefits in order to pursue their social goals. 
Warren Buffet’s 2011 New York Times op-ed calling for Congress to 
“raise rates immediately on taxable income in excess of $1 million” 
comes quickly to mind.202 But less public and more relevant examples are 
also available. Social welfare organizations organized under § 501(c)(4) 
are a common tool for donors interested in political activities from which 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are restricted or barred, despite their inability 
to receive tax-deductible contributions.203 Practitioners also report an 
uptick in donor interest in using both these § 501(c)(4) entities and 
business leagues organized under § 501(c)(6) to coordinate their 
philanthropic activities, although neither structure offers donors 
deductibility under the income or estate tax.204 By utilizing these vehicles, 
wealthy individuals and families are already leaving potential tax benefits 
on the table. 
                                                                                                                     
202. See Warren E. Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html.
203. See Brody & Owens, supra note 117, at 864–65. 
204. See Brakman Reiser, Lincoln & Mittermeier, supra note 121.
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Donors adopt these alternatives despite foregone tax benefits because 
of the other advantages they provide. Social welfare organizations and 
business leagues are by definition not subject to the private foundation 
rules; they are free to engage in more political activity than their 
§ 501(c)(3) counterparts;205 and they can provide donors with greater 
privacy.206 Unlike a philanthropy LLC, these forms generally retain tax 
exemption for organizational income.207 As social welfare organizations 
and business leagues are formed as state law nonprofits, though, they do 
not offer donors the kind of extensive control found in for-profit 
philanthropic alternatives. Founders of a § 501(c)(4) or § 501(c)(6) entity 
will not be able to change their minds and reclaim their donated assets 
down the line. Attorneys advising high-net-worth clients about these 
alternatives will certainly add the philanthropy LLC to the mix of options 
they detail—if they have not already. 
The growth in “family offices” also bodes well for wider adoption of 
the philanthropy LLC model. A family office is “a private investment 
firm that exclusively manages [a] family’s wealth, often with a long-term, 
multi-generational perspective.”208 A 2016 report estimated that “there 
are at least 10,000 single family offices in existence globally and at least 
half of these were set up in the last 15 years.”209 In addition to 
coordinating investments, family offices frequently manage a family’s 
philanthropic pursuits, often by coordinating transfers of wealth to the 
family’s private foundation or donor-advised funds. Philanthropy LLC 
structures would allow donors to bring these efforts entirely in-house,
                                                                                                                     
205. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
206. See Brody & Owens, supra note 117, at 864–65 (explaining that the major benefit of 
utilizing a § 501(c)(4) entity, rather than an explicitly politically exempt entity organized under 
Code § 527, is privacy). Section 527 organizations must publicly disclose every donor of more 
than $200 but donors to § 501(c)(4) organizations until recently remained confidential within the 
IRS. See id. The Trump administration’s recent removal of requirements that social welfare 
organizations and other non-charitable exempt entities disclose donor information to the IRS will 
only make these forms more attractive. See Rev. Proc. 2018-38, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/rp-18-38.pdf (announcing removal of donor disclosure requirements for (c)(4) and other 
non-charitable exempt entities, but not 527 organizations). Numerous helpful articles on the use 
and regulation of § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations can be found in the symposium issue 
at 21 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2018).
207. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2018). But see supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
(explaining the potential limitations on (c)(4) entities’ exemptions when they make political 
expenditures).
208. Nathan Crow & Gregory S. Crespi, The Family Office Exclusion Under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, 69 SMU L. REV. 97, 99 (2016).
209. EY, EY FAMILY OFFICE GUIDE 5 (2016), https://familybusiness.ey-
vx.com/pdfs/1003023-family-office-guide-v3-lr.pdf. A “single” family office manages the wealth 
of a single family, as compared with “multifamily offices” that service two or more families. Crow 
& Crespi, supra note 208, at 102.
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within existing family offices or new ones formed to include such 
purposes. The transition would be particularly seamless for the many 
family offices already structured as LLCs or groups of LLCs. Indeed, at 
least one of the marquis examples described here has already been 
recognized to function this way; investment industry sources often refer 
to the Emerson Collective as a family office.210
Family offices share not only structural elements with the 
philanthropy LLC, but also many of its most appealing characteristics. 
After reviewing the existing research on single family offices (SFOs), one 
commentator concluded, “[w]hat is evident from the literature is why the 
very affluent are increasingly using SFOs – they value factors such as 
privacy, control, flexibility and individualized service.”211 These wealthy 
families have spent millions to create bespoke family offices to maximize 
their flexibility, protect the family from scrutiny, and ensure the family’s 
control. Organizing a philanthropy LLC, or incorporating one into an 
existing family office structure, is a natural next step. 
For-profit philanthropy’s appeal is likely to spread beyond the rarefied 
circles of Silicon Valley’s technology magnates. Today’s swelling 
inequality means the rich continue to get richer, making more assets 
available for philanthropic pursuits. As their ranks increase, both 
domestically and globally, so does their sophistication in wealth 
management. At least some in this wealthy and powerful group are 
willing to tolerate relatively higher tax burdens in order to achieve their 
social goals. Innovative advisors and high-profile examples like CZI 
ensure they will soon discover the philanthropy LLC’s advantages in 
flexibility, privacy and control—and many will adopt it.
B. The Stakes for Society
Growth of philanthropy LLCs will impact the philanthropic sector and 
influence society at large. Some of these effects should be cause for 
celebration; others are causes for concern. Although current law offers 
few tools to impede the growth of philanthropy LLCs, it remains 
important to identify the trend’s benefits and drawbacks. Greater clarity 
will enable adopters and their counsel to understand the import of 
                                                                                                                     
210. See e.g., Emerson Collective, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/
organization/emerson-collective (last visited June 7, 2018); Emerson Collective, VENTUREDEAL,
http://www.venturedeal.com/VentureCapitalFirmProfiles/Emerson%20Collective.aspx (last 
visited June 7, 2018).
211. Heinrich Liechtenstein et al., Single Family Offices: The Art of Effective Wealth 
Management, in FAMILY VALUES AND VALUE CREATION: THE FOSTERING OF ENDURING VALUES 
WITHIN FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES 171 (Joseph Tapias & John L. Ward eds., 2008). A single 
family office serves only one family, while multifamily offices count several families among their 
clients. See id. at 170.
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individual decisions to utilize philanthropy LLCs more fully, and can 
guide policy makers as they develop responses.
1. A Capital Infusion for Social Good
The most important advantage of an increase in philanthropy LLC 
structures is its potential to draw more capital into efforts to tackle serious 
societal issues. As detailed above, a philanthropy LLC’s assets can be 
used in ways far beyond those permitted for assets contributed to 
traditional, nonprofit charity. To the extent this is money that would 
otherwise not be spent on achieving social good, society benefits. If as 
many high-net-worth individuals as possible give less of their wealth to 
their children, buy fewer yachts and vacation homes, and instead try to 
improve the lives of those less fortunate and save the planet, it is hard to 
be ungrateful. Even if they decide to take the assets back later, renting 
those assets is a potentially huge societal win. 
The soft underbelly of this argument, of course, lies in considering 
where this capital would be deployed if it were not devoted to for-profit 
philanthropic vehicles. If philanthropy LLCs displace asset-hoarding or 
rapacious consumption, they are surely a positive force. If these structures 
instead crowd out donations to more traditional nonprofit institutions, 
more caution is advisable. A knee-jerk reaction against philanthropy 
LLCs out of unfounded fears of crowding out is unwarranted, but this is 
an important empirical problem for further study.212
If evidence ultimately demonstrates that funding for philanthropy 
LLCs and other for-profit philanthropic vehicles does crowd out 
donations to conventional charities, concern is appropriate. The 
traditional, nonprofit philanthropic sector has been an important positive 
force in American society for over a century. Private foundations in 
particular supported early civil rights litigation,213 developed the 911
system,214 and have financed countless scientific breakthroughs and 
artistic masterworks.215 Since 1969, they have done so while complying 
with regulations that channel them toward steady, annual spending on 
                                                                                                                     
212. An early study of impact investing shows it has displaced only a small amount of 
charitable giving, but the researchers did not specifically study the philanthropy LLC. See U.S.
TR. & THE LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, supra note 56.
213. See Lynn Walker, The Role of Foundations in Helping to Reach the Civil Rights Goals 
of the 1980s, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 1055, 1058–62 (1985) (describing the Ford Foundation’s deep 
involvement in funding the NAACP during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s as well as 
other civil rights litigation efforts).
214. See JOEL L. FLEISCHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET; HOW 
PRIVATE WEALTH IS CHANGING THE WORLD 61 (2007) (describing the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation’s leadership in developing the 911 emergency response system).
215. See generally id. (providing one hundred case studies of the impact and outcome of 
foundations’ grantmaking programs).
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grants to public charities, careful stewardship, and considerable 
transparency. Upsetting this apple cart could risk weakening the 
philanthropic sector and its public bent.
These risks of disruptive philanthropy, however, counsel caution 
rather than condemnation. Traditional nonprofit philanthropies are not
without flaws. Nonprofit production can be highly inefficient. The 
considerable regulation imposed on nonprofit philanthropies can stifle 
innovation. The lobbying and campaign restrictions imposed on tax-
exempt entities can muzzle political involvement by those who would 
speak on behalf of the powerless.216 If the restrictions on traditional 
philanthropic institutions are viewed in this vein, the philanthropy LLC’s 
ability to bolster charitable donations with impact investments and direct 
political advocacy becomes a welcome salve. 
Even if the legal strictures placed on traditional nonprofit 
philanthropies were ideal and perfect, nonprofit law in action is also a far 
cry from the way it appears on the books. Regulators in this sphere are 
chronically underfunded.217 This lack of enforcement resources 
considerably undermines any advantages the nonprofit regulatory 
architecture can be expected to provide. To be rigorous, assessments of 
the comparative value philanthropy LLCs create should look honestly at 
more traditional philanthropic vehicles and their regulatory environment, 
warts and all.
Another important benefit of the rise of philanthropy LLCs is its 
impact on the wider for-profit sector. Disruptive philanthropy is tied to 
other trends blurring the boundary between traditionally charitable and 
business endeavors. Corporate philanthropy is a longstanding 
phenomenon,218 but in recent decades it has become far more strategic. 
Though few corporations have taken Google and GM’s extreme course 
of bringing their philanthropic programs inside the walls of their for-
profit businesses, today’s corporations are widely aligning their 
philanthropic programs more tightly with their business concerns.219
                                                                                                                     
216. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 106, at 61–62 (arguing for the removal of many of 
these restrictions).
217. See Brody & Owens, supra note 117, at 865–66 (describing the lack of resources at the 
IRS, particularly in the aftermath of the (c)(4) scandal); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, 
Duties of Nonprofit Corporate Directors-Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1845, 1879 n.163 (2012) (reviewing the literature describing state nonprofit regulators’ lack 
of resources).
218. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, PHILANTHROPY AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 31–
78 (1972) (describing the state of corporate philanthropy 45 years ago).
219. See, e.g., Caroline Preston, Rethinking Corporate Giving: Western Union’s CEO Offers 
Her Philosophy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (June 3, 2010), https://www.philanthropy.com/ 
article/Rethinking-Corporate-Giving/160569 (“When I first started out in business, corporate 
philanthropy meant presenting an oversized check and going home. For the most part, those days 
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Today’s programs address supply chain management by contributing to 
environmental remediation efforts where there key imports are located or 
labor continuity through training efforts that increase the supply of 
qualified employees, rather than simply making feel-good grants to the 
Red Cross or cultural organizations. 
Similarly, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become de 
rigueur. Corporate philanthropy programs make direct grants to 
charitable entities. CSR instead involves permeating business decisions 
with social and environmental considerations in order to take better
account of a business’ comprehensive impact.220 It is now difficult to find 
a major company without a CSR agenda. Critics can easily challenge the 
authenticity and effectiveness of these programs, but one cannot ignore 
their ubiquity.221 Social enterprises—businesses that pursue a dual 
mission of earning profits for owners and generating social good—are 
likewise on the rise,222 as are the impact investments that help fund 
them.223
These developments all share a foundational belief that business can 
be a force for good. Disruptive philanthropy is of a piece with them. As 
philanthropy LLCs grow in prominence and popularity, they broadcast 
the capacity of for-profit entities to be part of the project of innovating 
for social good—and encourage businesses to continue to follow suit.224
                                                                                                                     
are over.”). The work of Michael Porter and Mark Kramer has been influential in this shift. See
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy,
HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, 1, 1, https://sharedvalue.org/sites/default/files/resource-
files/Competitive_Advantage.pdf.
220. See Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility, FT.COM/LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR) (describing the CSR 
concept and movement and offering the approach of Unilever as one representative example). 
221. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 6–12 (2005) (describing the pervasiveness of CSR).
222. See Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 2017 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 92, 95 (“In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of 
organizations that combine profit-seeking with an altruistic or social mission.”).
223. See generally ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING:
TRANSFORMING HOW WE MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE (2011) (describing impact 
investment, its growth, and its adopters); NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY: A GUIDE TO THE 
NEW TOOLS AND ACTORS RESHAPING GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL INVESTING (Lester M. 
Salamon ed., 2014) (discussing social investment and its philanthropic impact).
224. Matthew Bishop and Michael Green present a strong argument for the value of blending 
the business and nonprofit spheres in PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE THE 
WORLD (2008) (discussing how “philanthrocapitalism” could have an impact on social problems 
throughout the world). Still, these trends are not without their detractors. Michael Edwards, 
longtime foundation manager and Director of Governance and Civil Society at the Ford 
Foundation, has cautioned that the turn toward for-profit solutions more broadly may be a fad 
with dangerous risks. See MICHAEL EDWARDS, JUST ANOTHER EMPEROR? 82–91 (2008).
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2. Magnifying Elite Influence
Despite the philanthropy LLC trend’s potential benefits, it is not 
without costs. The potential for crowding out has already been addressed. 
In addition, philanthropy LLCs tend to magnify the most negative aspect 
of traditional nonprofit giving: essentially, that it is elitist. For all of the 
good that wealthy individuals can do by devoting their fortunes to worthy 
causes, it means these wealthy individuals are the ones who decide which 
causes are the worthy ones, and what kinds of solutions to try. The rich 
already possess outsized power in our society. From Carnegie and 
Vanderbilt in the Gilded Age to Gates and Buffet in our own, amassing a 
mega fortune has earned the successful both civic admiration and public 
suspicion.
In his new and much-discussed book, David Callahan paints an 
unnerving picture of the power of elite philanthropy.225 In his words, 
“[p]rivate funders have been pushing more energetically into 
public life even as many ordinary people have been 
withdrawing—and even as a key means by which citizens do 
things together, government, is foundering.”226
He is not alone in worrying about the dark side of elite philanthropy. 
Legal scholars have identified the paternalism and even colonialism on
display in traditional nonprofit organizations.227 Political scientist Rob 
Reich recounts the “many antidemocratic features” of private 
foundations, including their lack of accountability, limited transparency, 
and empowerment of the dead hand.228 In her extensive research inside 
four of America’s most elite foundations, Megan Tompkins-Stange found 
that even grant makers themselves are disquieted by their industry’s lack 
of accountability and transparency.229 Although these scholars ultimately 
                                                                                                                     
225. See generally CALLAHAN, supra note 50; see also, e.g., Pablo Eisenberg, Time for a New 
Movement: Clamp Down on “The Givers” Who are Taking Too Much from Average Americans,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (July 6, 2017), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Opinion-The-
Givers-Are/240543 (reviewing CALLAHAN, supra note 50, and expanding on its themes); Alana 
Semuels, The Problem with Modern Philanthropy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/the-problem-with-philanthropy/520989/
(discussing CALLAHAN, supra note 50, and other critiques of elite philanthropy). 
226. See CALLAHAN, supra note 50, at 285.
227. See Garry W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them: 
Lessons of the Anti-NGO Movement, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 459, 479–92 (2012) (collecting legal 
and other critiques of NGOs, including private foundations, from the left and right); Eric Franklin 
Amarante, The Perils of Philanthrocapitalism 29–35 (Feb. 27, 2018) (unpublished research paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885550.
228. See Reich, supra note 12, at 67–70. 
229. See MEGAN E. TOMPKINS-STANGE, POLICY PATRONS: PHILANTHROPY, EDUCATION 
REFORM, AND THE POLITICS OF INFLUENCE 131–41 (2016).
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find these deficits do not make private foundations fundamentally 
incompatible with democracy, these attributes make it a close call.230 If
democracy needs to fear private foundations’ potential for plutocracy, 
philanthropy LLCs represent yet greater peril.231 They seriously 
underperform private foundations on the dimensions of accountability 
and transparency—and do so by design. 
By maximizing founder control, philanthropy LLCs insulate their 
founders not only from public scrutiny, but also from outside input. 
Callahan’s work collects the stories of a number of philanthropists who 
have been overconfident in their ability to port their success in business 
over to the philanthropic context.232 Some of them point this out for 
themselves; others have yet to learn this valuable lesson.233 Critics also 
chastise some elite philanthropists’ failures to attend to the interests and 
ideas of the very beneficiaries they purport to help.234 Elite 
philanthropists operating traditional nonprofit structures can easily act 
alone, with input from a few family members, or as part of a managing 
group drawn from socioeconomic and educational backgrounds similar 
to their own. Their governance arrangements can make it difficult to 
obtain ideas and feedback from beneficiaries, and the philanthropy LLC 
does nothing to remedy this structural flaw. Philanthropy LLC founders 
can make a point of seeking beneficiary input, as some foundations and 
grant makers do,235 but nothing in the form encourages such efforts.
Much of the regulatory apparatus restricting private foundations was 
enacted to prevent wealthy elites from using their philanthropic vehicles 
to amplify their already considerable influence on society. The political 
restrictions are the most obvious example, but even seemingly more 
technical rules are addressed in part to this concern. The five percent 
payout requirement236 prevents the affluent from stockpiling all of their 
funds indefinitely and forces them to spend it on current societal needs, 
at least as determined by the tax code’s definition of qualifying charitable 
recipients. The excess-business-holdings regime237 prevents a business 
                                                                                                                     
230. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 12, at 80–81. 
231. See Amarante, supra note 227, at 60–62.
232. See CALLAHAN, supra note 50, at 118 (“Making a bundle in software or short trading
doesn’t mean you’ll know the first thing about, say, K-12 education, and it’s easy for misguided 
philanthropists to do a lot of damage . . . .”); see also Amarante, supra note 227, at 60–62
(characterizing this as the problem of “amateurism”).
233. See CALLAHAN, supra note 50, at 119.
234. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 227, at 489.
235. See, e.g., TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 229, at 55–56 (describing some foundations’ 
embrace of “field-oriented” philanthropy, which “value[s] the democratic engagement of broad 
populations in decision-making processes as opposed to focusing on efficient and effective 
outcomes”).
236. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2018).
237. See generally id. § 4943 (describing the taxes on excess business holdings).
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owner from ostensibly stepping away from control of a business while 
maintaining her hold from the comfort of a private foundation. The 
transparency required by tax-exempt entities not only enables 
enforcement but also forces the efforts of these potential power-brokers 
into the light, where the media and the public may scrutinize them. 
All of this regulation comes by way of a very particular bargain. The 
government makes available tax-favored vehicles like private 
foundations, but allows philanthropists to use them only if they comply 
with the web of regulations intended to channel their efforts and curb their 
influence. The bargain falls apart if donors are willing to give up the tax 
advantages on offer, as do adopters of the philanthropy LLC. 
Philanthropy LLC founders need not concern themselves with complying 
with the private foundation rules. They can invest and donate as they 
please, on the schedule they desire, including to lobbying efforts and 
political campaigns, and all without surrendering the protection of tax 
confidentiality. 
Not only do these individual bargains go by the wayside, but the 
advent of disruptive philanthropy threatens to undercut private 
foundation law generally as an important lever for disciplining and 
curtailing elite power. Philanthropy LLC pioneers like Powell Jobs, 
Omidyar, Chan, and Zuckerberg shine a light on the path away from 
social control over the good they wish to see in the world. Their examples 
demonstrate how donors can reject the philanthropic deal on offer for the 
past five decades and instead embrace flexibility, privacy, and control. 
All it costs is a few more tax dollars, maybe not even so many more tax 
dollars as would initially appear. As more high-net-worth individuals
adopt this tactic, tax regulation diminishes as a mechanism for observing 
and channeling our most powerful elites.238
3. Prospects for Reform
It is hard to tote up the benefits and detriments of greater use of 
disruptive philanthropy. On the one hand, the empirical question of how 
much more capital it unleashes for valuable prosocial activities is 
essentially irresolvable. On the other, its costs to democracy and equality 
are impossible to value. The difficulty in calculating the difference 
between these unknowables only increases the challenge of evaluating 
policy responses. 
                                                                                                                     
238. It also may divide the world of philanthropy into those merely wealthy who can afford 
only the more public and heavily regulated private foundation or donor-advised fund route that 
comes with tax concessions, and the truly carefree rich, who can foot the somewhat higher tax bill 
associated with the more flexible and private philanthropy LLC. I thank Kerry Ryan for this 
insight.
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The philanthropy LLC is not an avenue law can easily foreclose with 
a targeted fix.239 Tax law could rejigger the tradeoff that philanthropists 
face when considering their options by increasing tax benefits attendant 
to private foundations or reducing the regulatory costs they impose. 
Neither approach seems particularly feasible or attractive. In light of 
widespread concerns over the pro-wealthy cast of the 2017 tax 
legislation,240 new proposals to reduce tax revenue by transparently 
increasing giveaways to the rich would seem to have dim political 
prospects. Reducing regulation might be more politically palatable, but 
dismantling the private foundation rules would counterproductively 
increase the very risks of elite influence that a response to the 
philanthropy LLC should combat.
Envisioning reforms to discourage philanthropy LLCs by increasing 
their costs or reducing their benefits is equally challenging. Tax law 
might penalize or prohibit charitable deductions for donations run 
through an LLC, but LLCs are an incredibly popular business form.241 It 
will be difficult to limit such an anti-abuse rule to philanthropy LLCs 
alone without explicitly targeting the rich in a highly unusual manner. It 
is likewise hard to see how investment, political, and operational 
restrictions and transparency requirements could legitimately be imposed 
only on philanthropy LLCs, especially without some tie to tax or other 
government benefits sought by their owners.
Policymakers could reject such surgical solutions to tame the 
philanthropy LLC in favor of broader responses to tackle societal 
inequality, of which this structure is only one small manifestation. 
Reformers could overhaul tax, business, and election law to limit elite 
influence and democratize our society. The philanthropy LLC would be 
easy to cabin or eliminate as part of such a radical reform effort. 
Realistically, though, this kind of reckoning is quite far off. If recent 
experience is any guide, our tax law is not going to become considerably 
more progressive in the near term, and limited liability companies and 
their preferential tax treatment are here to stay. Election law has been 
                                                                                                                     
239. But see Amarante, supra note 227, at 64–66 (arguing it would be possible, albeit very 
unlikely, to create and enforce a licensing requirement for philanthropic activity).
240. In a CNN poll in December 2017, shortly before final passage of the tax package, sixty-
six percent of respondents answered that they thought “the tax reform proposals made by the 
Republicans in Congress will do more . . . to benefit the wealthy” than the middle class. See SSRS,
CNN DECEMBER 2017 POLL 6 (2017), http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2017/images/12/18/rel12a.-
.trump.and.taxes.pdf.
241. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of
the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004-
2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459,
464 (2010) (describing the ascent of the LLC business form and reporting results of a study 
showing “that the LLC is now undeniably the most popular form of new business entity in 
America”).
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loosening restrictions rather than tightening them of late. The idea that 
individuals can use their own assets more or less as they wish will 
likewise be hard to dislodge, and rightly so. Private property is the 
bedrock of our legal system. Donors who do not seek any kind of tax or 
other public benefit in return for their largesse will most likely continue 
to be able to invest as they wish, donate to causes and candidates, and 
maintain their privacy as they do so. 
* * *
In the absence of targeted or large-scale policy responses to the 
philanthropy LLC, donors and their advisors can still be sensitized to the 
societal risks attendant to this model. They can be exhorted to weigh them 
in their calculus as they decide among philanthropic alternatives. 
Scholars and the media can attempt to tarnish the halo of philanthropy 
LLC founders by dispelling any false sense that their public pledges 
establish a transparent or permanent charitable endowment. 
Commentators can also expose philanthropy LLC founders who 
ultimately renege on their promises and take back or redirect resources 
they pledged to pursue social good—if and when they do so. But many 
donors will still find the tradeoff the philanthropy LLC offers compelling. 
Even a more educated public may not care very much, or for very long. 
And they may be right. The potentially enormous societal return on 
philanthropy LLC funders’ investments could be worth the risks they 
entail.
CONCLUSION
Chan and Zuckerberg are not the first to see the value in the 
philanthropy LLC, and they are very unlikely to be the last. Ultra high-
net-worth individuals, the high-net-worth cohort just below them, and 
even the millionaire next door will soon be considering this newly 
publicized philanthropic alternative. Many will like what they find. An
LLC structure can raise the tax burden of philanthropy somewhat, but in 
return it offers an enticing blend of flexibility, privacy, and control. While 
these are attractive attributes for donors, they do raise concerns for 
society more broadly. The regulatory burden imposed on tax-exempt, 
nonprofit vehicles channels elite philanthropy, and subjects it to some 
degree of transparency. Sidestepping this regime will make 
philanthropy—and its already privileged and influential purveyors—
more powerful and less public. Fortunately, this kind of disruptive 
philanthropy also has the exciting potential to draw new and greater 
assets to the cause of social good.
49
Reiser: Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
50
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/1
